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RESPONDING TO STERN V. MARSHALL 
ABSTRACT 
Stern v. Marshall is the most recent decision in a series of cases decided by 
the Supreme Court that involves the doctrine of public rights. The Court found 
that although 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) permits a bankruptcy court to enter 
final judgments on all counterclaims, Article III of the Constitution does not. 
The Court reiterated that Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution mandates the 
judicial power of the United States “be vested in one Supreme Court, and in 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.” The judges for these courts must have constitutionally protected 
salaries and tenure. Bankruptcy judges do not enjoy these protections, and so, 
may not hear matters that must come before Article III courts. 
The Supreme Court applied the relevant case law to its analysis in Stern, 
including American Insurance Co., Murray’s Lessee, Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 
Crowell, Thomas, Northern Pipeline Construction Co., Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, and Granfinanciera. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for 
the majority, relied heavily on Murray’s Lessee and Northern Pipeline despite 
more recent precedent. The Court glossed over the most important issue for 
bankruptcy courts in a footnote of its decision: “Because neither party asks us 
to reconsider the public rights framework for bankruptcy, we follow the same 
approach here . . . .” By declining to discuss further the public rights 
framework for bankruptcy, the Court left bankruptcy judges and practitioners 
to rely on precedent that is not dispositive—some of it very shaky. This 
Comment proposes a seven-factor analysis to help guide bankruptcy judges 
and practitioners, and to help shed some light on how to determine whether a 
matter is a public right and so may be heard and decided by a bankruptcy 
court.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the Supreme Court’s recent decision, Stern v. Marshall,1 the Court held 
that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), with respect to a state law counterclaim, 
violated the Constitution. Chief Justice Roberts wrote: “Article III of the 
Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States may be 
vested only in courts whose judges enjoy the protections set forth in that 
Article. We conclude today that Congress, in one isolated respect, exceeded 
that limitation in the Bankruptcy Act of 1984.”2 While the Court attempted to 
limit the scope of Stern, the Court confirmed that judges can no longer rely on 
Congress’s interpretation of a “core” proceeding.3 To circumvent this problem, 
this Comment proposes, that when there is doubt over whether a bankruptcy 
judge may constitutionally treat a proceeding as “core,” the court make the 
inquiries prescribed, albeit breezily, by Chief Justice Roberts, in a part of the 
majority opinion that is essentially dicta.4 These inquiries, which this 
Comment refers to as the “Stern factors,”5 are whether the matter: 
(1) can be pursued only by the grace of the other branches; 
(2) historically could have been determined exclusively by the other 
branches; 
(3) depends on the will of Congress; 
(4) flows from a regulatory scheme; 
(5) is completely dependent upon adjudication of a claim created by federal 
law; 
(6) is limited to a particularized area of the law; and 
(7) is a situation in which Congress created an expert an inexpensive way 
to deal with a class of questions of fact particularly suited for 
examination and determination by an administrative agency. 
Despite more recent precedent, the Court in Stern followed the plurality 
decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,6 in 
which the Court held that whether a matter may be heard by an Article I court 
without violating the Constitution ultimately depends on if it falls within the 
 
 1 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 2 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011). 
 3 Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp.), 456 B.R. 318, 323 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
2011). 
 4 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2613–15. 
 5 See id. at 2613–15. 
 6 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
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“public rights doctrine.”7 For the Court in Stern, this meant that whether a 
proceeding is a “core proceeding” also depends on whether it falls within the 
“public rights doctrine.”8 However, the Court declined to define or even further 
discuss the “public rights framework” of bankruptcy.9 Consequently, judges 
and other practitioners have been left to determine whether a proceeding fits 
within the public rights doctrine and how those public rights relate to 
bankruptcy. The difficulty with leaving this responsibility to bankruptcy judges 
is that Supreme Court precedent on public rights is unclear. 
The benefit of the process proposed in this Comment is that these inquiries 
relate to each previous public rights case. If properly followed, these inquiries 
ensure the identification of a “core” proceeding within the public rights 
framework for bankruptcy, regardless of what the Supreme Court chooses to 
do next with this doctrine.  
I. BACKGROUND AND THE EFFECT OF STERN V. MARSHALL 
Stern has a long and twisted history in the American judicial system.10 
Vickie Lynn Marshall, known to most as Anna Nicole Smith, married J. 
Howard Marshall in 1994.11 J. Howard died only a year after their marriage at 
the age of 90.12 Before J. Howard passed away, Vickie sued his son Pierce in 
Texas probate court, alleging that Pierce tortiously interfered with her 
expectation of an inheritance from her husband through fraud and undue 
influence over J. Howard.13 Pierce counterclaimed, alleging that Vickie and her 
lawyers had defamed him.14 
 
 7 See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609–11. 
 8 See id. 
 9 Id. at 2614 n.7 (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54–56 (1989) (citations omitted). 
 10 Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006). Its recent trip to the Supreme Court was its second. A 
previous issue in the case, regarding the probate exception to federal jurisdiction as it related to bankruptcy 
courts, was decided in May 2006. Id. 
 11 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 253 B.R. 550, 554 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000), adopted as 
modified, 275 B.R. 5 (C.D. Cal. 2002), vacated and remanded, 392 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d and 
remanded sub nom. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006), rev’d, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom. Stern, 131 S. Ct. 2594. 
 12 See id. at 553–54. 
 13 Kenneth N. Klee, Klee on Stern v. Marshall, 2011 LEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS 5743, at 1–2 
(June 2011). 
 14 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 600 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub. nom. Stern, 131 
S. Ct. 2594. 
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After J. Howard’s death, but before the case in Texas was fully litigated, 
Vickie filed for bankruptcy in California.15 Pierce then dismissed his case in 
the Texas court against Vickie and filed (1) an adversary hearing in the 
bankruptcy case to obtain a declaration that defamation liability was non-
dischargeable and (2) a proof of claim for damages resulting from the alleged 
defamation.16 Vickie predictably filed a counterclaim in the bankruptcy case 
against Pierce, again alleging tortious interference with her expectation of an 
inheritance.17 Ultimately, the bankruptcy court awarded Vickie $449,754,134, 
less any amount that she would recover in the case pending in probate court.18 
Pierce’s claim of defamation was settled in favor of Vickie on summary 
judgment.19 Originally, the bankruptcy court ordered that entry of judgment on 
her counterclaim should wait because the damages could not be calculated 
until a decision was made on how much inheritance Vickie was entitled to 
receive.20 However, the bankruptcy court was later persuaded that it could 
enter judgment before the probate court’s decision, “in a form to take account 
of any recovery . . . in the Texas probate action.”21 The award included 
damages to Vickie for her counterclaim against Pierce and, as the court 
emphasized, was also the result of Pierce’s egregious discovery violations.22 
To determine the outcome of Vickie’s counterclaim, the California 
bankruptcy court looked to Texas case law to determine whether it recognized 
a cause of action for tortious interference in the expectation of a gift.23 While 
determining that Texas did recognize this cause of action, the bankruptcy court 
could not identify the elements used for tortious interference.24 Consequently, 
the court applied the law of “other jurisdictions,” citing a New Mexico case as 
well as secondary sources, and concluded that tortious interference involved 
five elements, which it then applied to the case.25 
 
 15 Id.  
 16 In re Marshall, 600 F.3d at 1043–44. 
 17 Id. at 1044–45. 
 18 In re Marshall, 253 B.R. at 561–62. 
 19 Id. at 556 n.16. 
 20 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 257 B.R. 35, 40 (C.D. Cal. 2000) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
rev’d in part, 264 B.R. 609 (C.D. Cal. 2001).  
 21 Id.  
 22 In re Marshall, 253 B.R. at 553.  
 23 Id. at 559. 
 24 See id. 
 25 Id. at 559–60. 
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Pierce appealed to the district court, claiming the bankruptcy court lacked 
jurisdiction over the counterclaim because it was not a “core proceeding.”26 
The district court agreed and reversed the bankruptcy court’s decision on this 
basis, and then went on to decide the matter for itself (finding in Vickie’s 
favor) even though the Texas Probate Court had finally reached its own 
decision (in favor of Pierce).27 The case then went before the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.28 The court of appeals reversed, but only to the extent that it 
held the Texas court’s decision should have been given preclusive effect.29 
Vickie appealed to the Supreme Court.30 
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Congress’s grant of 
jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984 for the first time in Stern, decided in June 2011.31 The 
Court specifically addressed whether a bankruptcy court could, without 
violating the Constitution, enter a final judgment on a counterclaim seeking 
damages for the tortious interference of the expectation of an inheritance 
brought in a bankruptcy proceeding.32 The majority opinion, written by Chief 
Justice Roberts, stated: “Although we conclude that § 157(b)(2)(C) permits the 
Bankruptcy Court to enter final judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim, Article III 
of the Constitution does not.”33 The Court grounded a great deal of its decision 
in the doctrine of public rights,34 as developed in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken 
Land & Improvement Co.,35 Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co.,36 and Granfianciera S.A. v. Nordberg.37 
Among the cases principally relied upon in Stern, Murray’s Lessee was 
important to the Court because it was the first Supreme Court case to address 
the doctrine of “public rights.” Justice Curtis, writing for the majority in 
 
 26 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601–02 (2011). 
 27 Id. at 2602. 
 28 Id. at 2602–03. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See Stern, 131 S. Ct. 2594. The word “jurisdiction,” as it relates to bankruptcy courts, is used loosely 
throughout this Comment. Bankruptcy courts do not technically have jurisdiction. Instead, jurisdiction is 
invested in the district courts. The issue in Stern was whether bankruptcy courts have the power, without 
violating the Constitution, to hear and enter final judgment on the various cases assigned to it. 
 32 See id. 
 33 Id. at 2608. 
 34 See id. at 2610–15 (2011).  
 35 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). 
 36 458 U.S. 50, 73 (1982). 
 37 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
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Murray’s Lessee, concluded that Congress may not “withdraw from judicial 
cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at 
common law, or in equity, or admiralty.”38 From this, Chief Justice Roberts 
found that it was “clear that the Bankruptcy Court in this case exercised the 
‘judicial Power of the United States’ [when it purported] to resolve and enter 
final judgment” on the counterclaim.39 
Chief Justice Roberts treated Northern Pipeline as the seminal case in 
determining the validity of the bankruptcy court’s decision. The Supreme 
Court in Northern Pipeline held that the public rights doctrine did not permit 
bankruptcy courts to hear and enter final judgments on a state law case brought 
by a debtor against a company that had not filed a claim in that particular 
bankruptcy case.40 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Granfinanciera held that 
the public rights doctrine did not permit a fraudulent conveyance action to be 
“filed on behalf of a bankruptcy estate against a non-creditor in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.”41 The Court concluded that, combined, these cases meant that a 
“state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law” could not be 
included within the public rights exception.42 
The Court conceded that since the decision in Northern Pipeline, the public 
rights doctrine had been broadened. The doctrine now includes matters in 
which “the claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which 
resolution of the claim by an expert government agency is deemed essential to 
a limited regulatory objective within the agency’s authority,” or where the 
right involved was “integrally related to particular federal government 
action.”43 The counterclaim in Stern was not a claim typically pursued only by 
the grace of other branches, historically determined exclusively by those 
branches, completely dependent upon adjudication of a claim created by 
federal law, nor did the claim for relief flow from a federal statutory scheme.44 
Rather, the matter was a “state law action independent of the federal 
 
 38 Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284. 
 39 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611. 
 40 See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609–10 (quoting N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87 n.40 (plurality opinion)). 
 41 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614 (citing Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54–55). 
 42 Id. at 2611. 
 43 Id. at 2613 (discussing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 836 (1986); 
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 73 U.S. 568, 571–75 (1985)).  
 44 Id. at 2614. 
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bankruptcy law,” that did not “depend on the will of Congress,” and was “not 
limited to a ‘particularized area of law.’”45 
The bankruptcy court could not hear and enter a final decision in the 
counterclaim without violating the Constitution because the counterclaim was 
not a public right.46 However, the Court did not clarify the meaning of “public 
rights” as the term relates to bankruptcy law. In a footnote, the Court reiterated 
a statement made in Granfinanciera: 
We noted that we did not mean to “suggest that the restructuring of 
debtor-creditor relations is in fact a public right.” Our conclusion was 
that, “even if one accepts this thesis,” Congress could not 
constitutionally assign the resolution of the fraudulent conveyance 
action to a non-Article III court. Because neither party asks us to 
reconsider the public rights framework for bankruptcy, we follow the 
same approach here.47 
By highlighting the public rights doctrine without shedding any light on its 
scope, the Supreme Court has imposed a responsibility on bankruptcy court 
judges to create an infrastructure that does not violate Article III. 
Therefore, in considering whether public rights may be used to invoke 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction, practitioners and bankruptcy judges can only 
look to the constitutional roots of bankruptcy proceedings, the history of 
bankruptcy in federal jurisprudence, and the difficult to follow Supreme Court 
decisions that address the subject. Until a future Supreme Court decision, the 
only means of determining whether a matter is a public right is to examine, 
case-by-case, the factors that various Supreme Court cases have used to 
determine when a matter is a public right. Given the divergent types of 
analyses relied on in the public rights cases, it is possible that the Stern factors 
may not all point to the same outcome. However, this is the unfortunate 
consequence of a decision that tantalizes but, in the end, fails to satisfy 
curiosity. 
 
 45 Id. at 2614–15 (2011) (citing Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 284 (1856)). 
 46 See id. at 2611. 
 47 Id. at 2614 n.7 (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54–56 (1989)) (citations 
omitted). 
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II. CONGRESSIONAL POWERS 
A. The Power to Establish Article I Courts 
Bankruptcy courts are Article I courts (also referred to as legislative 
courts). Article I courts are created by Congress to execute its powers; Article I 
court judges do not have, or need, Article III tenure and compensation 
protections.48 The Supreme Court introduced the concept of legislative courts 
in American Insurance Co. v. Canter.49 The plaintiffs argued that an order for 
the sale of cotton issued by the Court of Key West was invalid because the 
issuing court was an “incompetent tribunal.”50 The tribunal in question was 
established by an act of the territorial legislature of Florida.51 Therefore, the 
sale would be valid only if the territorial legislature was competent to enact the 
law.52 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Supreme Court, emphasized the 
importance of the relationship between Florida and the United States.53 He 
wrote that even though Florida inhabitants enjoyed the same benefits as 
citizens of the United States, “[t]hey do not, however, participate in political 
power; they do not share in the government till Florida shall become a state.”54 
As a result, Florida was a territory governed by Congress according to Article 
IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power 
“to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory, or other 
property belonging to the United States.”55 
The jurisdiction of Florida’s territorial courts covered all criminal cases and 
only civil cases arising under the laws of that territory, and the judges of these 
courts were to hold their offices for four years.56 From this, Chief Justice 
Marshall concluded that these courts were not Article III courts, but rather 
“legislative Courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which 
exists in the government,” or, by virtue of Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2.57 
The limitations on federal courts in the states, therefore, did not extend to the 
 
 48 See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 450 (1929). 
 49 See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 514 (1828). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 541. 
 52 Id. The libellants argued that the act was “inconsistent with both the law and the [C]onstitution; that it 
is inconsistent with the provisions of the law, by which the territorial government was created.” Id. at 543. 
 53 Id. at 542. 
 54 Id.  
 55 Id. at 541–42 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2). 
 56 Id. at 544. 
 57 Id. at 546. 
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territories. Congress could legislate for the territory because in doing so, 
Congress acted as a state government would for a state.58 The law created by 
the territorial legislature was not unconstitutional and, thus, was valid.59 
Congress may also statutorily open federal courts in the states to actions 
brought by a citizen of the District of Columbia (“D.C.”), against a citizen of 
one of the states.60 The statute only gave federal courts jurisdiction over 
controversies of a judiciable nature; it did not confer power to participate in 
legislative, political, or administrative functions.61 Congress may exercise 
judicial power to: (1) pay debts of the United States;62 (2) confer the district 
courts jurisdiction of non-diversity suits involving only state law questions; 63 
and (3) “to make uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies,” in Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 4 (the “Bankruptcy Clause”).64 Accordingly, Article I was 
the source of power for reorganizations and bankruptcies.65 
By virtue of the Bankruptcy Clause, Congress has the power to authorize 
Article III courts to hear non-Article III matters.66 Thus, a trustee could bring a 
plenary suit in personam in a district court because the district court’s 
jurisdiction (in a case where the trustee relies only on state law) flowed from 
federal law.67 A case flows from a federal law (and so is conferred 
congressional power by Article III)68 when: 
[A] right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States [is] an element . . . of the plaintiff’s cause of 
action . . . The right or immunity must be such that it will be 
 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. It has been contended that one of the primary reasons for finding that the territorial courts were not 
Article III, but rather Article I courts was that: 
If and when a territory became a state, a significant portion of the duties performed by its courts 
was to be assumed by a newly established state judiciary. If the judges of the territorial courts 
had the life tenure protections of Article III, Congress would have been hard pressed to know 
what to do with many of them.  
MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 55 (2d 
ed. 1990). 
 60 Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 583 (1949). 
 61 Id. at 591. 
 62 Id. at 592. 
 63 Id. at 596–99. 
 64 Id. at 594. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See id. at 594–99. 
 67 Id. at 596.  
 68 Id. at 599. 
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supported if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given 
one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another.69  
Also pursuant to Article I, Congress may create a statute for D.C. (the 
“D.C. Code”) that provides for trying local criminal cases before judges 
without Article III protections because D.C. citizens, like the citizens of states, 
do not have a constitutional right to be tried before Article III courts when 
charged with a criminal violation.70 The D.C. Code did not arise “under the law 
of the United States;” if the D.C. Code did arise “under the law of the United 
States,” then the prosecution of matters pursuant to the D.C. Code by Article I 
courts would be an unconstitutional exercise of Article III power.71 Congress 
has the discretion over the creation of inferior federal courts; however, if 
Congress does create these courts, it is not required to grant them “all the 
jurisdiction it was authorized to bestow under Art. III.”72  
The enforcement of criminal laws has never been the “exclusive province” 
of Article III.73 Congress’s decision to create D.C. courts with judges not given 
Article III status was grounded in efficiency and the fact that the majority of 
states did not provide state judges with protections equivalent to those in 
Article III.74 In considering the D.C. Code, Congress’s (and the Court’s) 
comparison to state courts may be misguided for two reasons: first, Article III 
does not constrain the states, but does limit Congress; and second, the tenure 
and salary provisions of Article III help ensure the judiciary’s independence 
from the federal legislative and executive branches, but state courts are already 
independent from these federal branches.75  
The constitutionality of bankruptcy courts as Article I courts depends on 
whether Congress has the power to create non-Article III courts to deal with 
bankruptcy and the limits on that power. Article I gives Congress the power 
“[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the 
United States,”76 and this power is strengthened by the power “[t]o make all 
 
 69 Id. at 597 (quoting Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112–13 (1936)) (emphasis omitted). 
 70 Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 390–91 (1973).  
 71 Id. at 400. 
 72 Id. at 401. 
 73 Id. at 402 (emphasis added).  
 74 Id. at 409–10. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that “46 of the 50 states have 
not provided life tenure for trial judges who hear felony cases.” Id. at 410. But see discussion infra Part II.E. 
(discussing the opinion in Northern Pipeline that Congress’s interest in creating an efficient bankruptcy system 
was not sufficient basis for granting bankruptcy courts broad jurisdiction).  
 75 REDISH, supra note 59, at 63–64. 
 76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
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Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers.”77 
Article III limits Congress’s powers by (1) creating a federal judiciary, (2) 
establishing the conditions of the judiciary appointments, and (3) painting in 
broad strokes the scope of the judiciary’s power. Article III mandates that:  
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made . . . to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a 
party . . . .78  
B. Congress’s Power Under the Bankruptcy Clause 
Congress may create some Article I courts pursuant to its specific powers. 
Under the Bankruptcy Clause, the main constraint on Congress’s power is the 
“uniformity requirement.”79 Aside from this limitation, congressional powers 
regarding bankruptcy included “the power to discharge the debtor from his 
contracts and legal liabilities, as well as to distribute his property.”80 Unlike 
state governments, Congress has the power over contracts, which “extends to 
all cases where the law causes to be distributed, the property of the debtor 
among his creditors.”81 Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the Constitution (the 
“Contract Clause”) reflects “[t]he Framer’s intent to achieve uniformity among 
the Nation’s bankruptcy laws.”82 Attempts made by members of the 
Constitutional Convention to prohibit the federal government from interfering 
 
 77 Id. cl.18. 
 78 Id. art. III, §2; see also id. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o constitute Tribunals 
inferior to the supreme Court.”). The limits on Congress’s powers to interfere with the judiciary were 
emphasized in Murray’s Lessee. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
272, 284 (1856); see also discussion supra Part II.C.1. 
 79 Ry. Labor Execs.’ Assn. v. Gibbons Tr., 455 U.S. 457, 472 (1982) (finding that RITA violated the 
Uniformity Clause of the Constitution because it applied to only one regional bankrupt railroad and thus the 
employee protection provisions therein could not be said to apply equally to all creditors and debtors). Here, 
the Court refers to the Bankruptcy Clause as the Uniformity Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“To 
establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 80 Ry. Labor Execs.’ Assn., 455 U.S. at 466 (quoting Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 
(1902)). 
 81 Id. at 466 (quoting Hanover Nat’l Bank, 186 U.S. at 186); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 82 Ry. Labor Execs.’ Assn., at 472 n.14; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into 
any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”). 
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with contracts failed because the framers recognized that the prohibition would 
undermine the legislative power to pass laws on bankruptcy.83 
James Madison explained that Congress was given the power to create 
uniform laws on bankruptcies because of the intimate connection between 
bankruptcy and interstate commerce. Madison wrote: 
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy, is so 
intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will 
prevent so many frauds where the parties live, or their property may 
lie, or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it 
seems not likely to be drawn into question.84 
Congress may also prevent states from passing or enforcing laws that would 
interfere with any national bankruptcy statute.85 Although the Eleventh 
Amendment protects state sovereignty, states may “still be bound by some 
judicial actions without” waiving their immunity.86 In fact, the Supreme Court 
has held that the states, “whether or not they choose to participate in the 
proceeding, are bound by a bankruptcy court’s discharge order no less than 
other creditors.”87 Additionally, Congress may authorize Article III courts to 
hear non-Article III matters because judicial power was conferred under 
Article I.88 Precedent could be construed to argue that the Bankruptcy Clause is 
the source of congressional power regarding all cases relating to bankruptcies, 
in both Article I and Article III courts.89 
Unfortunately, Congress’s power under the Bankruptcy Clause to create 
bankruptcy courts is controlled by the public rights doctrine. The definition of 
“bankruptcy” will help ultimately determine the limits of Congress’s power to 
 
 83 Charles J. Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
5, 13 (1995). 
 84 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott, ed. 1898); Tabb, supra note 83, at 13. 
Congress’s power regarding bankruptcy implicates its power over contracts, its power over interstate 
commerce, and as some cases suggest, the Necessary and Proper Clause. Why the thrust of these clauses—or 
the combined “constitutional grant of power”—is not understood as giving Congress “extraordinary control 
over the precise subject matter at issue,” is puzzling. Recall that an “extraordinary control over the precise 
subject matter at issue” would allow Congress to create Article I courts for the determination of bankruptcy 
matters, as it does for territories and courts-martial, regardless of public rights. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 66 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
 85 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1928); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 86 Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 446 (2004). 
 87 Id. at 441 (citing New York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U.S. 329, 333 (1933)). 
 88 See Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1948). 
 89 An argument later rejected by Northern Pipeline and Stern. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 
2611 (2011); N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 76 (plurality opinion); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
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create bankruptcy courts (eventually, through the application of the Stern 
factors).90 Under the current system, bankruptcy courts must “provide an 
equitable system for distribution of a debtor’s assets to creditors in the event of 
bankruptcy.”91 The Supreme Court has recognized that: “The subject of 
bankruptcies is incapable of final definition. The concept changes . . . [but] is 
nothing less than the ‘subject of the relations between an insolvent or 
nonpaying or fraudulent debtor and his creditors, extending to his and their 
relief.’”92 Precedent has established that bankruptcy courts (as Article I courts) 
may only hear and enter final determinations on matters that are public rights.93 
Whether a matter is a public right has been the subject of intensive inquiry, 
with no bright-line rule. As discussed above, the application of the Stern 
factors requires an understanding of the difficult to follow course of Supreme 
Court decisions that address the public rights doctrine, as well as an 
understanding of the legislative history for the current bankruptcy system.94 
C. The Development of the Public Rights Doctrine (1828–1977) 
1. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.95 
In Murray’s Lessee, the Court held that Congress did not violate the 
Constitution when it statutorily authorized proceedings under a distress warrant 
issued by the Solicitor of the Treasury because such proceedings were 
executive acts, not judicial.96 The Court’s analysis first considered whether the 
particular warrant at issue constituted due process, which he defined as “by law 
of the land.”97 To determine whether Congress satisfied due process of law 
with respect to a particular act, a court must first look to the Constitution for an 
indication of whether a particular process created by Congress conflicted with 
any other constitutional provisions.98 If no conflict is identified, a court should 
 
 90 See discussion supra Part I. 
 91 S. REP. NO. 98-55, at 3 (1st Sess. 1983). 
 92 Wright v. Union Cent. Ins. Co, 304 U.S. 502, 513–14 (1938) (internal citation omitted). This definition 
is later used in Northern Pipeline, Granfinanciera, and in footnote seven of Stern. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614 
n.7. 
 93 See Stern, 131 S. Ct. 2594; Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); N. Pipeline, 458 
U.S. 50. 
 94 See supra discussion Part I.  
 95 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856). 
 96 See id. at 274. 
 97 Id. at 275–76. Congress was limited here because it could not merely make any process “due process 
of the law” to suit its own needs. Id. at 276. 
 98 Id. at 275–76. 
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then look to any “settled usages and modes” for proceedings that existed in 
both common and statutory law in England, the states as they were before the 
Declaration of Independence, and the states as they were before the 
Constitution.99 Justice Curtis determined that “there has been no period, since 
the establishment of the English monarchy, when there has not been, by the 
law of the land, a summary method for the recovery of debts due to the crown, 
and especially those due from receivers of the revenues.”100 As a result, the 
proceedings authorized in Murray’s Lessee satisfied due process of law.101 
Justice Curtis stated that equitable claims to land by the inhabitants of 
ceded territories were examples of cases that “form a striking instance of such 
a class of cases”—the class of cases being those that involve public rights.102 
These cases depend “upon the will of congress” as to whether a remedy in the 
courts would even be allowed.103 Congress acted within its power when it 
consented that the government may be sued and, because Congress consented, 
it was entitled to set the rules and terms for the proceedings in which it would 
be sued.104 Therefore, giving power to the executive—in this manner—was 
constitutional.105 The matter of partially or fully waiving sovereign immunity 
with regard to Congress’s power to tax, combined with Congress’s power 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, as well as Congress’s creation of a 
statutory scheme relating to its tax power, was a matter that could be pursued 
by the grace of the legislative branch, and therefore depended upon the will of 
Congress. 
2. Ex Parte Bakelite Corp.106 
Bakelite Corp. (“Bakelite”) petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of 
prohibition to the Court of Customs Appeals.107 The writ, if issued, would 
prohibit the Court of Customs Appeals from considering appeals of findings by 
the Tariff Commission pursuant the Tariff Act of 1922.108 Under the Tariff 
Act, the Tariff Commission was given the power to assist the President by 
 
 99 Id. at 277. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See id. at 280. 
 102 Id. at 284. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See id. at 283. 
 105 Id. at 285. 
 106 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 439. 
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“investigating allegations of unfair practice, conduct hearings, receive 
evidence and, making findings and recommendations, subject to the right in the 
importer or consignee.”109 The findings and recommendations could then be 
appealed to the Court of Customs Appeals, but only as to the questions of law 
that affected the findings.110 Decisions by the Court of Customs Appeals could 
then, if needed, be subject to Supreme Court review.111 
Bakelite challenged the jurisdiction of the Court of Customs Appeals, 
arguing that Congress created it pursuant to Section 1 of Article III, and so, the 
court could not have jurisdiction over proceedings not considered a “case or 
controversy” under Article III, Section 2.112 Bakelite argued that the 
proceeding before the Tariff Committee was not a “case or controversy” but an 
advisory proceeding “in aid of [an] executive action.”113 Justice Van Devanter 
explained that Article III did not “express the full authority of Congress to 
create courts,” because other articles gave Congress the power to create courts 
to help carry “those [other] powers into execution” as well.114 The Court 
concluded that the Court of Customs Appeals was not an Article III court but 
an Article I (legislative) court.115 Because the Court of Customs was an Article 
I court, there was no need to decide whether the pending proceeding was a 
“case or controversy” under Article III.  
Legislative courts may be special tribunals created to determine matters 
arising between the government and others which, based on their nature, do not 
require “judicial determination,” though they may still be determined by an 
Article III court.116 Suits against the government in the Court of Claims were 
not controlled by the Seventh Amendment and were not suits at common law 
“within its true meaning.”117 Since the government may not be sued unless the 
government consents, Congress can prescribe how the government is sued.118 
Therefore, if the “claimant avail[ed] himself of the privilege granted [to sue the 
 
 109 Id. at 446–47. 
 110 Id. at 447. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 447–48. 
 113 Id. at 448. 
 114 Id. at 449. 
 115 Id. at 460–61. 
 116 Id. at 451. 
 117 Id. at 453. 
 118 Id. at 453–54. 
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government], he must do so subject to the conditions [set] by the 
government.”119 
To determine the appropriate jurisdictions of the Court of Customs Appeals 
and the Customs Court, the Court briefly reviewed the history of each court.120 
The Customs Court was formerly the Board of General Appraisers, an 
executive agency responsible for “reviewing acts of appraisers and collectors 
in appraising and classifying imports and in liquidating and collecting customs 
duties.”121 Congress changed the name of the board to the Court of Customs, 
but did not alter any of the board’s duties, powers, or personnel.122 The board’s 
functions, “although mostly quasi-judicial, were all susceptible of performance 
by executive officers and had been performed by such officers in earlier 
times.”123 Thus, the functions performed by the Court of Customs and the 
Court of Customs Appeals were historically handled by the executive branch. 
Bakelite also argued that the absence of a provision on the tenure of Court 
of Claims judges was evidence Congress meant to establish the court under 
Article III.124 The Court concluded that this argument was “fallacious” because 
it “mistakenly assume[d] that whether a court is of one class or the other 
depends on the intention of Congress, whereas the true test lies in the power 
under which the court was created and in the jurisdiction conferred.” 125 While 
the Court refused to view congressional intent as determinative of the court’s 
class, the Court did find relevant the fact that Congress had only ever given the 
Court of Claims the power to issue advisory opinions on certain matters—
suggesting Congress treated the Court of Claims as a legislative court.126 A few 
 
 119 Id. at 454. 
 120 Id. at 452, 457–58. 
 121 Id. at 457. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 458 (emphasis added). Quasi-judicial means “of, relating to, or involving an executive or 
administrative official’s adjudicative acts. Quasi-judicial acts, which are valid if there is no abuse of discretion, 
often determine the fundamental rights of citizens. They are subject to review by courts.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1411 (9th ed. 2009). Recall the first two Stern factors—whether the matter (1) can be pursued 
only by the grace of the other branches; and, (2) historically could have been determined exclusively by the 
other branches. See supra Part III. 
 124 Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 459. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. This conclusion is striking and strange because the jurisdiction conferred by Congress may also be 
evidence of congressional intent, Ex parte Bakelite Corp. and Williams are no longer law. REDISH, supra note 
59, at 58–59. Congress responded to the Court’s decisions in Ex parte Bakelite Corp. and Williams by 
providing in its Act of July 28, 1953 that both the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the 
United States Court of Claims were established under Article III. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 531–
32 (1962) (citing Act of July 28, 1953, § 1, 67 Stat. 226 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 171 (2006)) 
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years later the Court made a similar decision in Williams v. United States,127 in 
which it considered whether Congress could reduce the salaries of judges 
sitting on the Court of Claims without violating that constitution.128 The Court 
in Williams held that the Court of Claims was created pursuant to Congress’s 
Article I powers.129 
The Court later addressed its Bakelite and Williams decisions in Glidden 
Co. v. Zdanok, decided by the Supreme Court in 1962.130 The Court in Glidden 
questioned the assumption, expressed in both Bakelite and Williams, that for 
Congress to effectively grant jurisdiction to an administrative agency, it need 
only codify that jurisdiction.131 The Court in Glidden explained that the 
Bakelite and Williams courts misunderstood the thrust of Murray’s Lessee.132 
Read correctly, Murray’s Lessee supports the proposition that Congress may 
choose to create tribunals under Article III to adjudicate matters that may also 
be determined by legislative and executive decision.133 According to the Court 
in Glidden, Congress’s power under Article I to create courts inferior to the 
Supreme Court has never been relied on as authority for Congress to create 
non-Article III tribunals.134 The assignment of the Court of Claims judges—
 
(Court of Claims); Act of August 25, 1958, § 1, 72 Stat. 848 (repealed 1982) (Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals); see also Act of July 14, 1956, § 1, 70 Stat. 532 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 251 (2006)) 
(Customs Court). 
 127 289 U.S. 553 (1933). 
 128 Id. at 561. 
 129 Id. at 581. 
 130 Glidden, 370 U.S. 530.  
 131 Id. at 541–43. The Supreme Court combined Glidden with Lurk v. U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia. REDISH, supra note 59, at 60 n.49. The cases related to two assignment statutes, the first of which 
permitted the Chief Justice to temporarily assign a judge from the Court of Claims or the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals to any court of appeals or district court for necessity. Glidden, 370 U.S. at 532 n.2 (quoting 
28 U.S.C. § 293(a)). The second case authorized the assignment of retired judges from either the Court of 
Claims or the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to Article III courts. Id. at 532 n.3 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 294(d)). The petitioners in these cases argued that they were denied the constitutional protection of judges 
with life tenure and non-diminishable compensation as a result of these Acts. Id. at 533. The Court limited its 
analysis to whether the judgment in either case was vitiated by the respective participation of the judges. Id. 
The case was made more confusing because both judges at the time had statutorily protected tenure and salary, 
rather than constitutionally protected tenure and salary. Id. at 534. Without constitutional protection, a 
subsequent Congress would not be bound by these statutory protections. Id. Whether the judges had 
constitutionally protected tenure and salary at the time of their confirmation depended on the constitutional 
status of the courts to which they were appointed. Id. at 541. The Court determined in Ex parte Bakelite and 
Williams that the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals were Article I courts, and only 
later made Article III courts by Congress. Id. at 534. Thus, the Article III protections were not conferred upon 
appointment. Id. 
 132 Glidden, 370 U.S. at 542–43. 
 133 Id. at 550–51. 
 134 Id. at 543; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
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and judges of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals—to sit on “other” 
Article III courts did not violate the Constitution because both Article I courts 
and Article III courts are created pursuant to Article III.135 The Court rejected 
the assumption that just “because an Article I body could adjudicate suits 
against the United States, such suits could not be simultaneously considered 
Article III cases.”136 
The remainder of Glidden is divided into two sections determining whether 
the legislation that established (A) the Court of Claims and (B) the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals, complied with the limitations of Article III.137 To 
determine this, the Court examined (1) the courts’ histories, (2) the 
development of their functions, and (3) the courts’ present characteristics.138 
For the Court of Claims, there were “substantial indications” in the legislative 
history that demonstrated Congress believed it was establishing an Article III 
court.139 These indications were the ability to appeal its cases, previous cases 
that indicated the Supreme Court’s belief that the Court of Claims was an 
Article III court, and a statement made by President Lincoln that the court was 
created to remove its particular matters from “the Halls of Congress” to the 
Judicial Branch.140 
As for the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the act under which the 
court was created was silent on the tenure of its judges, just as the Judiciary 
Act of 1798 had been silent on the matter.141 Finally, the Court noted 
similarities between the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Commerce 
Court, and the Emergency Court of Appeals (the latter two of which are Article 
III courts).142 The most significant similarities between these courts were the 
circumstances that prompted the establishment of each.143 These needs were: 
[F]irst, the special competence in complex, technical and important 
matters that comes from narrowly focused inquiry; second, the 
speedy resolution of controversies available on a docket encumbered 
 
 135 REDISH, supra note 59, at 60–61. 
 136 Id. at 61. 
 137 Glidden, 370 U.S. at 552. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 553. 
 140 Id. at 553–55. 
 141 Id. at 558. But see Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929). 
 142 Glidden, 370 U.S. at 560. 
 143 Id. at 560–61. 
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by other matters; and third, the certainty and definition that come 
from nationwide uniformity of decision.144 
Ultimately, the Court held that both courts were Article III tribunals and that 
the judges for those courts, including retired judges, were Article III judges.145 
However, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA) superseded the 
Court’s decision in Glidden.146 FICA gave the jurisdiction over direct access 
suits to the newly established United States Claims Court, an Article I court.147 
3. Crowell v. Benson148 
In Crowell, the Court considered whether a district court may grant a de 
novo hearing of a case originally heard by a deputy commissioner of the 
United States Employees’ Compensation Commission and brought under the 
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”).149 
Valid application of LHWCA turned on whether the deputy had jurisdiction 
over the matter.150 The jurisdictional requirements under the act were (1) the 
locality of the injury and (2) the existence of a relationship between an 
employee and his or her employer.151 Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the 
Court, noted that “there can be no doubt that the act contemplates that as to 
questions of fact, arising with respect to injuries . . . within the purview of the 
act, the findings of the deputy commissioner . . . shall be final.”152 Further, 
“[t]o hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation 
to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert, and inexpensive method for dealing 
with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and 
determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task.”153 
Chief Justice Hughes used language from Murray’s Lessee and Ex parte 
Bakelite., to distinguish private and public rights.154 Following this precedent, 
Chief Justice Hughes concluded that Congress may establish legislative courts 
 
 144 Id. at 560. 
 145 Id. at 584. 
 146 See Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 147 Id. 
 148 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
 149 See id.  
 150 See id. at 33. 
 151 Id. at 62. 
 152 Id. at 46. 
 153 Id. (emphasis added). 
 154 Id. at 50–51 (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 
(1856); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).  
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when “the mode of determining” a particular class of matters is within 
congressional control.155 Matters completely within congressional control 
include the governing of territories and D.C., as well as “matters, arising 
between the government and others, which from their nature do not require 
judicial determination and yet are susceptible to it.”156 Congress has complete 
control over the mode used to determine matters involving public rights, so 
Congress may delegate the adjudication of these matters to itself, the Executive 
Branch, or the Judicial Branch.157 
The matters considered in Crowell were private rights, defined as “of the 
liability of one individual to another under the law.”158 While Congress does 
not have complete control over the mode used to determine matters involving 
private rights, Congress is not restrained by any requirement that all 
subsequent “determinations of fact in constitutional courts” be made by 
judges.159 The use of juries as fact finders, as required by the Constitution in 
particular cases, supports this statement.160 Moreover, cases that do not require 
juries, such as those in equity or admiralty, typically have commissioners or 
assessors advise the court on certain classes of questions.161 If the findings 
made by these advisors are based on evidence, “in the absence of errors of 
law,” then their reports were not to be disturbed.162 
Article III mandates that the power of the judiciary extends to all cases of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, but does not limit how the courts are to 
proceed in these cases.163 As a result, Congress may control the “extent of the 
power as well as the mode of proceeding in which [admiralty and maritime] 
jurisdiction [was] to be exercised.”164 However, Congress may not exercise 
 
 155 Id. at 50. 
 156 Id. (quoting Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272). 
 157 Id. at 50–51 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S. 438). See discussion infra Part II.C.1 (discussing 
Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272).  
 158 Crowell, 285 U.S. 22, 52 (1932).  
 159 Id. 
 160 See id. at 51–52. Chief Justice Hughes provided other examples, including: “determinations of fact by 
boards and commissions created by the Congress to assist in its legislative process in governing various 
transactions subject to its authority, as for example, the rates and practices of interstate carriers.” Id. at 58. 
 161 Id. at 51–52. The use of commissioners or assessors was typically done without the consent of the 
parties. Id. at 51. 
 162 Id. at 51–52. 
 163 Id. at 53.  
 164 Id. However, Congress’s powers were limited when “amending and revising maritime law,” because 
Congress could not “reach beyond the constitutional limits which are inherent in the admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction.” Id. at 55. Consequently, the Court noted that “[u]nless the injuries to which the Act relates occur 
upon the navigable waters of the United States, [the case falls] outside that jurisdiction.” Id. 
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this control by substituting an agency for a court based simply on an agency’s 
“utility and convenience.”165 When “fundamental rights are in question . . . the 
difference in security of judicial over administrative action,” is significant.166 
Jurisdictional questions are questions in which fundamental rights, or 
constitutional rights, may be involved.167 As a result, Chief Justice Hughes 
applied the constitutional avoidance doctrine.168 Under the Court’s analysis, 
the commissioner’s decisions on jurisdictional facts were not final, but all 
other determinations of fact made by the commissioner acting “within his 
authority” were final.169 The finality of these decisions did not violate the 
Constitution if based on evidence and if parties received “due notice, [and had 
a] proper opportunity to be heard.”170 
4. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Commission171 
The question before the Court in Atlas Roofing was whether Congress 
could create a new cause of action for “civil penalties enforceable in an 
administrative agency where there [was] no jury trial,” without violating the 
Seventh Amendment.172 In 1970, Congress instituted the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act (“OSHA”), in response to what it considered a ‘“drastic’ 
national problem” of work-related deaths and injuries.173 OSHA created two 
 
 165 Id. at 57. Chief Justice Hughes rejected the argument that within this particular act, Congress 
designated a single deputy commissioner as a fact-finding tribunal because, to accept that contention would 
“[make] the untenable assumption that the constitutional courts may be deprived in all cases of the 
determination of facts upon evidence,” regardless of whether a constitutional right was involved. Id. at 60–61. 
Read correctly, the statute had a “limited application” and consequently, the agency was “confined to its 
proper sphere.” Id. at 65. 
 166 Id. at 61. Though fact-finding has been delegated to juries, commissioners, and assessors, the actions 
of these fact-finders are under the “‘presence and superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on 
the law and to advise them on the facts, and . . . to set aside their verdict, if, in his opinion, it is against the law 
or the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1899)). At least for juries, the 
twelve or so members of a jury are independent of the Legislative Branch in that they are not paid to render 
decisions, and serve only the length of one case. REDISH, supra note 59, at 75–76. 
 167 See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 61–63. 
 168 Id. at 63. Chief Justice Hughes summarized the constitutional avoidance doctrine as “[w]hen the 
validity of an act of Congress is drawn into question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, 
it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible 
by which the question may be avoided.” Id. at 62. 
 169 Id. at 62–63. 
 170 Id. at 63. Questions of jurisdiction are questions in which fundamental rights, or constitutional rights, 
may be involved. See id. at 61–63. 
 171 430 U.S. 442 (1977). 
 172 Id. at 444. 
 173 Id. (citing S. REP. 91-1282, at 2 (1970)). 
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remedies: (1) abatement orders requiring employers to correct unsafe working 
conditions; and, (2) the imposition of civil penalties on employers that 
maintained unsafe working conditions.174 OSHA was not meant to affect the 
“existing state statutory and common-law remedies for actual injury and 
death.”175 
Atlas Roofing argued that a government suit for civil penalties, for violation 
of OSHA, was a classic suit at common law.176 If such suits were common law 
suits, then Congress’s assignment of jurisdiction to an administrative agency 
with no jury trial was unconstitutional.177 The Court rejected this argument: 
[T]he right to a jury trial turns not solely on the nature of the issue to 
be resolved but also on the forum in which it is to be resolved . . . It 
created a new cause of action, and remedies [which were] unknown 
to the common law, and placed their enforcement in a tribunal 
supplying speedy and expert resolutions of the issues involved. The 
Seventh Amendment is no bar to the creation of the new rights or to 
their enforcement outside the regular courts of law.178 
The Court’s conclusion was based on certain aspects of OSHA, including the 
stipulation that findings by the Commission—on questions of fact—were final, 
if supported by “substantial evidence on the record, considered as a whole,”179 
and a provision that provided for the enforcement of penalty payments, only 
available if the Secretary of Labor commenced a collection action in federal 
district court.180 Furthermore, the meaning of the phrase “suits at common 
law,” within the Seventh Amendment was “construed to refer to cases tried 
prior to the adoption of the Seventh Amendment in courts of law in which [a] 
jury trial was customary . . . .”181 Suits of common law can be distinguished 
from statutory proceedings and rights.182 Congress may grant legislative courts 
the power to enforce statutory rights “free from the strictures of the Seventh 
Amendment.”183 Just as Congress can establish legislative courts to decide 
 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 449. 
 177 Id. at 450. 
 178 Id. at 460–61. See also Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) (holding that criminal 
defendants on trial in the District of Columbia did not have a constitutional right to an Article III court because 
the trial was authorized under Congress’s Article I power).  
 179 Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 446–47. 
 180 Id. at 447. 
 181 Id. at 449 (citing Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830)). 
 182 Id. at 453–54 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1937)). 
 183 Id. at 454. 
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matters that arise between the government and others, Congress can create 
“new statutory ‘public rights.’”184 
Justice White, writing for the majority, explained public rights are litigated 
in: 
[C]ases in which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to 
enforce public rights created by statutes within the power of Congress 
to enact the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from 
assigning the factfinding function and initial adjudication to an 
administrative forum with which the jury would be incompatible.185 
Justice White did not cite any precedent for this definition. He distinguished 
these cases from those in Crowell, where “factfinding by an administrative 
agency, without intervention by a jury, only as an adjunct to an Article III 
court,” was acceptable when the issues involve only, or “purely,” private 
rights.186 In this case, the issues did “not involve purely ‘private rights.’”187 
If courts supply a cause of action and an adequate remedy to litigants in a 
matter, then the matter needs to go before a jury.188 The Seventh Amendment 
“preserves” the right to a jury trial as it existed in 1789;189 it was not meant to 
prevent Congress from creating “new public rights and remedies by statute,” or 
determining the appropriate enforcement mechanisms.190 In this case, 
Congress, through OSHA, created a new cause of action with remedies 
unknown in common law.191 
 
 184 Id. at 455. 
 185 Id. at 450. 
 186 Id. at 450 n.7. 
 187 Id.  
 188 Id. at 458–59. 
 189 Id. at 459. 
 190 Id. at 460. Conceivably, a factor in the Court’s decision was that Congress determined that the 
common law remedies available for work-related injuries as a result of unsafe working conditions were 
inadequate. Id. at 461. Additionally, in these public rights cases, “[w]holly private tort, contract, and property 
cases, as well as a vast range of other cases as well are not at all implicated.” Id. at 458. 
 191 Id. at 461. For Stern factor (4)—does it flow from a regulatory scheme—Chief Justice Roberts cited 
Atlas Roofing. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2613 (citing Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 458). The citation 
refers to the line: “Our prior cases support administrative factfinding in only those situations involving ‘public 
rights,’ e.g., where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid statute 
creating enforceable public rights.” Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 458. To regulate means “the act or process of 
controlling by rule or restriction.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1398 (9th ed. 2009). 
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D. The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 (the “Act”) was the culmination of ten years 
of work and compromise that included over 106 days of hearings, at least 130 
witnesses, over 100 adopted amendments, several hundred written statements 
and comments, competing bills, and eight distinct drafts.192 One of the greatest 
points of contention was whether Congress should give Article III status to 
bankruptcy judges.193 The Act granted bankruptcy judges broad jurisdiction 
that enabled them to hear “virtually any matter arising in, or related to the 
bankruptcy case.”194 Congress hoped that this vast jurisdictional system would 
be a significant improvement upon previous bankruptcy acts.195 
Congress debated whether it had the power to establish an Article I court 
(rather than debating what the public rights framework for bankruptcy was, or 
what types of cases could be considered by Article I courts).196 The House 
seemed aware of the possible repercussions for failing to give bankruptcy 
courts Article III court status.197 Unfortunately, Congress’s concern about these 
repercussions conflicted with Congress’s desire for a system of bankruptcy 
courts that would expedite bankruptcy cases and prevent the dilution of Article 
III court status.198 
Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, Representative Peter Rodino, 
Jr., asked several constitutional experts questions regarding two versions of the 
proposed bill.199 The most pertinent of these questions were: “What is the 
constitutional status of the described courts . . . ?” and “May . . . the courts 
described exercise the full jurisdiction described?”200 While the responses 
 
 192 See Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941 (1979). 
 193 Tabb, supra note 83, at 34. 
 194 Id. Bankruptcy judges had all the “powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty,” except for the 
power to enjoin another court, or punish a criminal for contempt not committed in their presence. N. Pipeline 
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 55 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
 195 Tabb, supra note 83, at 34. 
 196 Id. at 34–35. 
 197 Klee, supra note 192. 
 198 See id. 
 199 See Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 2682–2706 (1976) [hereinafter Bankruptcy 
Act Revision]. 
 200 Id. at 2683. Representative Rodino described the proposed jurisdiction as: 
[B]roader than that presently exercised by district courts sitting in bankruptcy and by referees in 
bankruptcy . . . the present distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction of the referee, 
based on possession of property by the debtor or trustee . . . would be abolished . . . all actions 
related to a bankrupt estate would be tried in the new bankrupt court . . . . [T]he new bankruptcy 
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expressed no consensus as to the constitutionality of the jurisdiction granted to 
the courts in each bill, there was a consensus that the courts, if established, 
were controlled by Article I.201 One respondent wrote that the courts “would be 
Article I courts [and in his view] there [was] no doubt of the power of 
Congress to establish such courts.”202 Still, another respondent wrote: “It 
seems pretty clear to me that the proposed bankruptcy courts would indeed be 
exercising the judicial power of the United States and would have to be 
constituted in accordance with the requirements of Article III.”203 Of the 
eleven responses recorded, not a single constitutional expert mentioned the 
public rights doctrine.204 
According to the House Judiciary Committee, if bankruptcy courts were 
not given Article III status, it would “raise serious constitutional doubts” to 
grant bankruptcy courts all powers necessary for an efficient bankruptcy 
system such as the power to enjoin other courts and contempt powers.205 The 
Senate opposed granting bankruptcy judges Article III status, advocating 
 
court would be given all powers, judicial in nature, necessary to carry out its responsibilities, 
including the power to cite and punish contempts, to hold jury trials, to enjoin other courts and 
proceedings in them, and to enter judgment and issue writs of execution. 
Id. at 2682 (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, judges would be removable for incapacity, misconduct, or 
neglect of duty and would be appointed by the President, to serve fifteen-year terms. Id. 
 201 See id. 
 202 Id. at 2685 (letter of Erwin N. Griswold, Jones Day, Reavis & Pogue) (quoting Ex Parte Bakelite, 279 
U.S. 438, 449 (1929)). Mr. Griswold based this belief on Ex parte Bakelite Corp., which he quoted: 
It long has been settled that Article III does not express the full authority of Congress to create 
courts, and that other Articles invest Congress with power in the exertion of which it may create 
inferior courts and clothe them with functions deemed essential or helpful in carrying those 
powers into execution.  
Id. at 2687. 
 203 Id. at 2684 (letter of Brice M. Clagett, Covington & Burling LLP). 
 204 See id. Congress considered two interpretations of the Court’s decision in Crowell. Id. at 2697 (letter 
of Terrance Sandalow, Professor of Law, University of Michigan). The first interpretation authorized an 
administrative agency to decide workmen’s compensation claims, subject to judicial review, even though this 
meant the agency was empowered to adjudicate claims involving private rights. Id at 2698. Under this first 
interpretation the Court’s decision rested on the fact that issues of law were subject to review in an Article III 
court. Id. If Congress chose to follow the first interpretation, then Congress could create Article I bankruptcy 
courts as long as the decisions made by these courts were subject to judicial review in an Article III court. Id. 
The second interpretation was a more narrow reading of the Court’s decision under which the legislation was 
sustained because the agency in Crowell “was not authorized to exercise the full range of powers traditionally 
associated with ‘the judicial power.” Id. If Congress chose to follow this second interpretation, it could create 
bankruptcy courts as long as these courts were not given this full range of judicial powers. Id; see also supra 
Part II.C.3 (discussing the facts of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)). 
 205 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 1, 7, 12 (1977). 
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instead that bankruptcy courts be made adjuncts of the district courts.206 Much 
of the Senate’s argument focused on recommendations made by the Judicial 
Conference,207 which believed that any changes should be made through the 
existing system.208 Chief Justice Burger, as head of the Judicial Conference, 
strongly objected to the elevation of bankruptcy judges to Article III status.209 
The Chief Justice spoke individually with Senators and with the President 
about opposing the final version of the bill.210 The Judicial Conference’s 
insistence that Congress’s goal could be achieved without giving bankruptcy 
judges Article III status likely assuaged Congress’s constitutional doubts. 
E. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.211 
Four years after its enactment, the Supreme Court found the Act 
unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline.212 Northern Pipeline filed for 
reorganization and later filed suit in the bankruptcy court against Marathon 
Pipeline for damages that resulted from alleged breach of contract and 
warranties, misrepresentation, coercion, and duress.213 Marathon Pipeline 
moved to dismiss the suit on grounds that the Act “unconstitutionally conferred 
[Article] III judicial power upon judges who lacked life tenure and protection 
against salary diminution.”214 The bankruptcy judge denied the motion, but this 
judgment was reversed on appeal when the district court found that “the 
delegation of authority in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 to the Bankruptcy Judges to try 
 
 206 See Bankruptcy Act Revision, supra note 199, at 367 (statement on behalf of the Ad Hoc Comm. on 
Bankr. Legislation of the Judicial Conference of the United States). 
 207 See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006) (creating and describing the role of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States).  
 208 See Bankruptcy Act Revision, supra note 199, at 368. 
 209 Klee, supra note 192, at 954. 
 210 Id. at 954, 956. The Chief Justice has authority to transmit to Congress and the President the 
recommendations of the Judicial Conference relating to legislation. Id (explaining that while Title 28 U.S.C. 
§ 331 (1976) authorizes the Chief Justice to make recommendations to Congress about legislation, but it does 
not have an “express authorization . . . to transmit recommendations for legislation to the President."); see also 
Ruggeri J. Aldisert, The Judicial Conference and the New Bankruptcy Act, 65 A.B.A. J. 229 (Feb. 1979) 
(chastising Professor Klee for suggesting that the Chief Justice violated separation of powers when he 
attempted to influence Congress and the President about the 1978 Act). On October 17, 1978, by unanimous 
vote, the Judicial Conference, rather than the Chief Justice acting alone, urged the President to veto the bill. 
Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial Conference and the New Bankruptcy Act, 65 A.B.A. J. 229 (Feb. 1979). 
 211 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 212 Id (plurality opinion). 
 213 Id. at 56. 
 214 Id. at 56–57. 
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cases which [were] otherwise relegated under the Constitution to Article III 
judges was unconstitutional.”215 
The case then went to the Supreme Court. The plurality opinion, written by 
Justice Brennan, emphasized the importance of an independent judiciary and 
the system of checks and balances.216 Justice Brennan explained that the 
framers of the Constitution sought to prevent tyranny or the accumulation of 
legislative, judicial, or executive powers in “the same hands, whether of one, a 
few, or many.”217 In so doing, the framers settled on what became Article III, 
Section 1 of the Constitution, which provides that “the judicial Power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”218 Section 
1 requires that judges serving in these courts have life tenure, are subject to 
removal from office only by impeachment, and receive undiminished 
compensation while in office.219 Justice Brennan wrote: “our Constitution 
unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle—that the ‘judicial Power 
of the United States’ must be reposed in an independent Judiciary [and that it] 
commands that the independence of the Judiciary be jealously guarded.”220 The 
appointment of bankruptcy judges under the Act clearly did not comport with 
these requirements.221 Rather than enjoying life tenure, bankruptcy judges were 
only appointed for fourteen-year terms and could be removed from office for 
incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability.222 
Congress could also diminish bankruptcy judges’ salaries.223 
Northern Pipeline claimed that the Act was constitutional, for two 
reasons.224 First, Congress may establish legislative courts with jurisdiction to 
 
 215 Id. at 57. 
 216 Id. at 58–60 (citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217–20 (1989); United States ex rel. Toth v. 
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 531 (1933)). 
 217 Id. at 57 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (H. Lodge ed., 1888)). 
 218 Id. at 58–59 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1). 
 219 Id. The Compensation Clause is significant because “a power over a man’s subsistence” is tantamount 
to “a power over his will,” and thus without it, an independent judiciary could not be maintained. Id. at 60 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 491 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888)). 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. at 60–61. 
 223 Id. at 61. 
 224 Id. at 62. 
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decide cases to which the Article III judicial power extends.225 Second, 
Northern Pipeline argued that “even if the Constitution does require that this 
bankruptcy-related action be adjudicated in an Article III court, the Act in fact 
satisfies that requirement,” because bankruptcy courts were adjuncts of the 
district courts.226 To defend this argument, Northern Pipeline relied on 
Murray’s Lessee. 
Northern Pipeline argued that Congress could create legislative courts 
pursuant to only specific Article I powers, “when there [was] a particularized 
need for distinctive treatment.”227 Justice Brennan characterized this limitation 
as more illusory than real, because the broad range of questions that could be 
brought in bankruptcy court demonstrated that Congress, acting through a 
“specialized” court and “pursuant to only one of its many [Article] I powers,” 
could erode Article III court jurisdiction.228 Precedent, particularly Crowell, 
stood for the proposition that congressional grants of power to an agency were 
only tolerable when that agency’s jurisdiction was limited to “specialized, 
narrowly confined factual determinations regarding a particularized area of 
law.”229 
Justice Brennan then dismissed Northern Pipeline’s second argument—that 
bankruptcy courts were adjuncts of the district court—and its interpretation of 
precedent, particularly, Murray’s Lessee: 
[W]hen properly understood, these precedents represent no broad 
departure from the constitutional command that the judicial power of 
the United States must be vested in Art. III courts. Rather, they 
reduce to three narrow situations not subject to that command, each 
recognizing a circumstance in which the grant of power to the 
 
 225 Id. at 62, 63 n.14 (quoting Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 408 (1973) (“the plenary grants of 
power in Article I permit Congress to establish non-Article III tribunals in specialized areas having 
particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment.”). 
 226 Id. at 62–63. 
 227 Id. at 73–74. 
 228 Id.  
 229 Id. at 84–85 (1982) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). In addition to contrasting the administrative 
agency at issue Crowell from bankruptcy courts because the agency was limited to a particularized area of law, 
Justice Brennan contrasted the agency in Crowell to the bankruptcy courts under the Act of 1978. Through this 
comparison Justice Brennan enumerated four additional factors to advance the conclusion that the grant to 
bankruptcy courts was unconstitutional: 1) the agency engaged in a narrow, statutorily defined fact-finding 
while the bankruptcy courts exercise all jurisdiction given to district courts; 2) the agency had power to issue 
only compensation orders, whereas bankruptcy courts had all the powers of district courts; 3) bankruptcy 
courts judgments were subject to more deference than the agency; and 4) the agency had to seek enforcement 
orders in district court, whereas bankruptcy courts issued final judgments. Id. at 85–86 (citations omitted). 
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Legislative and Executive Branches was historically and 
constitutionally so exceptional that the congressional assertion of a 
power “to create legislative courts was consistent with, rather than 
threatening to, the constitutional mandate of separation of powers.”230 
These three narrow situations are: (1) cases in military courts; (2) cases in 
courts that lie exclusively outside the States of the Federal Union, including the 
territories and D.C.; and (3) cases included within the doctrine of public 
rights.231 The plurality limited the doctrine of public rights to cases in which 
the federal government was a party and “only to matters that historically could 
have been determined exclusively by” the executive and legislative 
branches.232 Therefore, the substantive legal rights in this case—contract 
rights—were not public rights.233 The establishment of bankruptcy courts with 
“jurisdiction over all matters related to those arising under the bankruptcy 
laws” did not fall into one of the three recognized situations.234 Justice Brennan 
asserted that “the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core 
of the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the adjudication 
of state-created private rights, such as the right to recover contract 
damages . . . . The former may well be a ‘public right,’ but the latter obviously 
 
 230 Id. at 63–64. 
 231 Id. at 65–67. See also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) (explaining that Congress may 
establish legislative courts “which are to form part of the government of territories, or of the District of 
Columbia, or to serve as special tribunals ‘to examine and determine various matters, arising between the 
government and others, which from their nature do not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of 
it.’”).  
 232 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 68 (plurality opinion). 
 233 Id. at 71. The Northern Pipeline decision seems logical in its definition of public rights as those that 
“at a minimum arise ‘between the government and others’’’ because it closely follows the example of 
Murray’s Lessee. See id. at 70 (citing Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50; Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 
(1929)). However, Justice Brennan’s argument for this definition—that it was established to aid in the 
preservation of the separation of powers—is illogical. See N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 93 (White, J., dissenting). 
The difficulties with his argument are apparent when compared against Article III which specifically mandates 
that the judiciary power extends to “[c]ontroversies to which the United States shall be a party.” U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also REDISH, supra note 59, at 58–76. The same problem arises in the later Supreme 
Court cases, Thomas and Schor, in which Justice O’Connor (writing for the majority in each) stated that 
“public rights,” which do not have to be adjudicated in an Article III court, are those which are “so closely 
intertwined” with a federal statute. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). Her analysis closely resembles Article 
III, in that the judicial power was meant to extend to all cases “arising under … the Laws of the United States.” 
U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 1. 
 234 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 76 (plurality opinion).  
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is not.”235 Consequently, the broad grant of jurisdiction in the Act was 
unconstitutional.236 
F. Bankruptcy Courts and the Federal Judgeship Act of 1984  
After Northern Pipeline, Congress again grappled with whether to grant 
Article III authority and protections to bankruptcy judges.237 Just as before, the 
House favored conferring Article III power to bankruptcy judges and the 
Senate stubbornly opposed.238 Congress finally decided bankruptcy courts 
would be units of the federal district courts and distinguished between core and 
non-core proceedings to limit the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.239 
Bankruptcy courts could hear and enter final judgments as to core proceedings, 
but were merely fact finders subject to de novo review by the district courts for 
non-core matters.240 Congress enumerated sixteen core proceedings in 28 
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). 241 
Congress took over a year to respond to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Northern Pipeline. Once Congress responded, it approached the same 
problems as it had before enacting the Act in 1978.242 The Senate Judiciary 
Committee published a report243 discussing Northern Pipeline’s 
pronouncement of the Act’s unconstitutionality, a history of bankruptcy laws, 
and the Senate’s proposed bill.244 Notwithstanding the depth and reasoning in 
the Committee’s report, the report only mentions “public rights” within its 
summary of the Northern Pipeline decision.245 The report espoused the 
Committee’s view that bankruptcy judges should not be given Article III 
status. The Committee believed that giving bankruptcy judges Article III status 
would delay implementation of the Act; significantly increase the number of 
Article III judges (in turn, diluting their significance); and ultimately reduce 
 
 235 Id. at 71. 
 236 Id. at 87–88. The Court concluded that Congress could not merely “remove the jurisdiction” and leave 
the rest of the bankruptcy system intact. Id. at 87 n.40. 
 237 Tabb, supra note 83, at 39. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (2006). 
 242 See supra Part II.D. 
 243 Bankruptcy Court and Federal Judgeship Act (To Accompany S. 1013), S. REP. NO. 98-55 (1983). 
 244 See generally id. (indicating that S. 1013 gave district courts greater control over bankruptcy courts 
and the effect on state law matters). 
 245 Id. at 9. 
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Congress’s flexibility, thereby affecting the overall workability of the 
system.246 
The National Bankruptcy Conference (“NBC”),247 in a statement prepared 
for the House, stated that the plurality in Northern Pipeline indicated 
constitutional objections were unlikely to “extend to efforts authoriz[ing] 
Article I courts to enforce ‘Congressionally created rights,’ or ‘public 
rights.’”248 Private rights, on the other hand, were defined here as “rights 
created by state law.”249 In another statement prepared for the House, U.S. 
Bankruptcy Judge Ralph H. Kelley emphasized the enormous inclusion of state 
law issues in bankruptcy, all of which could be considered private rights.250 
Judge Kelley strongly asserted his belief that Congress should grant 
bankruptcy courts Article III status because without such status, the entire 
bankruptcy system would be “slow, clumsy, costly, and of doubtful 
legality.”251 
The House Judiciary Committee prepared the Report on the Bankruptcy 
Court Act of 1982 in which it asserted that, “[t]he adjustment of debtor-
creditor relations does not involve public rights, because generally the contest 
is solely among private litigants.”252 Accordingly, the essence of bankruptcy 
litigation was “the determination of disputes between private parties grounded 
in state law.”253 The Report also quoted then-Assistant Attorney General 
Jonathan C. Rose, who stated that “many of the functions of the bankruptcy 
court require bankruptcy judges to adjudicate questions of private civil law; 
however, it is doubtful whether a bankruptcy court could efficiently 
adjudicate” a case unless bankruptcy judges are given the power to hear those 
 
 246 Id. at 30–32. 
 247 A group of leading bankruptcy scholars and practitioners who serve as a resource to Congress on 
major bankruptcy legislation. Our Mission, NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, http://www. 
nationalbankruptcyconference.org/mission.cfm (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).  
 248 See Bankruptcy Court Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 3 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and 
Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 185 (1983) (statement of National Bankruptcy 
Conference in Opposition to Proposed Judicial Conference Rule). 
 249 See id. 
 250 Id. at 195. (statement of J. Ralph H. Kelley, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of 
Tennessee) (“Let me assure you that approximately five thousand of [ten thousand] hearings [heard in his 
court] involved the adjudication of state law issues between private litigants in matters arising in or related to 
title 11 cases.”).  
 251 See id. at 196. 
 252 See H.R. REP. NO. 97-807, at 6 (1982). But see discussion supra Part II.E. (discussing N. Pipeline 
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line, Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)). 
 253 See H.R. REP. NO. 97-807, at 6 (1982). 
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matters.254 The Report contained no other discussion of public rights.255 The 
then-Assistant Attorney General Rose also submitted his own statement to 
Congress wherein he suggested that though “some aspects” of bankruptcy 
concern “public right[s],” the majority of issues in bankruptcy proceedings 
involve “private rights of the parties.”256 
Professor Martin H. Redish discussed the public versus private rights 
dichotomy before the Senate Judiciary Committee.257 The thrust of his 
statements was that the dichotomy was an illogical conclusion by Justice 
Brennan, rather than an analysis of what would necessarily constitute a 
“private,” or a “public” right.258 Professor Redish provided Congress with what 
he believed were the only options to solve the bankruptcy dilemma.259 Of the 
five options provided, only one fits within the public and private rights 
scheme.260 But rather than mentioning public rights, Professor Redish 
suggested that Congress keep the bankruptcy courts as Article I courts, and 
“remove from [their] jurisdiction to adjudicate all state common law claims 
involving the bankrupt,” and give that jurisdiction to the federal district 
courts.261 
G. Interpretations of Public Rights since Northern Pipeline 
1. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products262 
The Supreme Court in Thomas considered “whether Article III of the 
Constitution prohibits Congress from selecting binding arbitration with only 
limited judicial review . . . for resolving disputes among participants in [the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act’s (“FIFRA”)] pesticide 
registration scheme.”263 Union Carbide asserted that Congress transgressed the 
limitations of Article III when it allocated judicial powers to arbitrators 
 
 254 Id. at 17. 
 255 See id. 
 256 See Manville Bankruptcy and the Northern Pipeline Decision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 209 (1982) (statement of Jonathan C. Rose, Assistant 
Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
 257 See Northern Pipeline Bankruptcy Decision, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th 
Cong. 307 (1982) (testimony of Professor Martin H. Redish, Northwestern University School of Law). 
 258 See id. at 307–08. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. at 319. 
 261 Id. (emphasis added).  
 262 473 U.S. 568 (1986). 
 263 Id. at 571. 
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resolving compensation disputes among FIFRA registrants.264 According to 
Union Carbide, Congress could not require the use of arbitration for disputes 
among registrants under FIFRA without also providing for review of the 
arbitrators’ decisions by Article III courts.265 
Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor emphasized the Court’s long-
standing recognition of Congress’s power under Article I “to vest decision-
making authority in tribunals that lack the attributes of Article III courts.”266 
Justice O’Connor also noted that many cases involving private interests are 
decided by agencies “with limited or no [judicial] review by Article III 
courts.”267 According to Justice O’Connor, the plurality only restrained 
Congress from vesting the power to adjudicate and issue binding orders in 
cases involving state contract law without prior consent of the litigants, even 
when the orders were subject to appellate review in Article III courts.268 
Union Carbide contended that FIFRA conferred a private right to 
compensation, which required Article III court adjudication or review, an 
argument based on the distinction between public and private rights drawn by 
the plurality in Northern Pipeline.269 Private rights, as defined in Northern 
Pipeline, included “the liability of one individual to another under the law as 
defined.”270 Public rights were “matters arising between the Government and 
persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the 
constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments.”271 
However, because the Northern Pipeline decision did not command a majority 
of the Court, its theory on the public versus private rights dichotomy—in so 
much as it was a bright-line test—was not binding precedent.272 Therefore, the 
Thomas Court held that “practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire 
reliance on formal categories should inform [the] application of Article III.”273 
 
 264 Id. at 576. Appellees were thirteen firms that engaged in developing and marketing chemicals used to 
make pesticides. For simplicity, I will refer to appellees “Union Carbide.” 
 265 Id. at 582–83. 
 266 Id. at 583. 
 267 Id. These cases provided for D.C. Courts, the Deputy Commissioner of Employees’ Compensation 
Committee, and treasury accounting officers, among others. 
 268 Id. at 584. According to Justice O’Connor, in Northern Pipeline, Justice Brennan noted “that discharge 
in bankruptcy, which adjusts liabilities between individuals, is arguably a public right.” Id. at 586.  
 269 Id. at 585. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67–68 (1982) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 272 Id. at 586. 
 273 Id. at 587. 
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The Court decidedly rejected Northern Pipeline’s (and Crowell’s) definition of 
public rights cases as those between the government and an individual.274 
Nonetheless, certain substantive aspects of FIFRA did not infringe upon 
Article III. Most significant was that the right created by FIFRA had more 
characteristics in common with a public right than a private right.275 Two of 
these characteristics highlighted Congress’s powers: first, “to authorize an 
agency administering a complex regulatory scheme to allocate costs and 
benefits among voluntary participants in the program without providing [for] 
Article III adjudication;”276 and second, “to condition issuance of registrations 
or licenses on compliance with agency procedures.”277 The last characteristic 
indicating the matter was more of a public right was that the “[u]se of a 
registrant’s data to support a follow-on registration serve[d] a public purpose” 
as “an integral part of a program” meant to safeguard public health.278 
Congress did not “diminish the likelihood of impartial decision-making, 
free from political influence” when it gave civilian arbitrators—selected by 
agreement among the parties or appointed on a case by case basis by an 
independent federal agency—the power to fix the amount of compensation for 
follow-on registrants under FIFRA.279 In delegating this authority, Congress 
was apparently motivated by the “near disaster of the FIFRA 1972 
amendments” and the threat to public health caused by delayed pesticide 
registration.280 Finally, FIFRA’s allocation of powers to arbitrators was not 
absolute, and so it did not preclude review by Article III courts.281 The Court 
concluded that FIFRA did not violate the constitution, but: 
[the] holding is limited to the proposition that Congress, acting for a 
valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under 
Article I, may create a seemingly “private” right that is so closely 
integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter 
appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the 
Article III judiciary.282 
 
 274 Id. at 589. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. 
 279 Id. at 590. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. at 592. 
 282 Id. at 593–94 (emphasis added). Other relevant language throughout the opinion is: “For purposes of 
compensation under FIFRA’s regulatory scheme, however, it is the ‘mandatory licensing provision’ that 
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2. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor283 
Only one year later, the Supreme Court addressed another issue concerning 
public rights and, again, Justice O’Connor wrote for the majority.284 In Schor, 
the question before the Court was whether the Commodity Exchange Act 
(“CEA”) granted the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) the 
power to consider and make determinations on state law counterclaims in 
reparation proceedings and if so, whether that grant violated Article III.285 The 
CEA permitted individuals (complainants) injured by professional 
commodities brokers to apply to the CFTC for an order commanding the 
offending broker to pay reparations.286 The complainant could then, if needed, 
seek enforcement of the order in federal district court.287 
In this case, Schor filed complaints against ContiCommodity Services 
(“Conti”).288 Conti counterclaimed, alleging Schor was indebted to Conti.289 
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) in the reparations proceeding in the 
CFTC found in favor of both Schor’s claims and Conti’s counterclaims.290 
After this decision, Schor challenged the statutory authority of the CFTC to 
hear Conti’s counterclaims but was unsuccessful with this argument before the 
ALJ.291 Schor appealed to the D.C. Circuit, which noted: “[T]he CFTC’s 
exercise of jurisdiction over Conti’s common law counterclaim gave rise to 
‘[s]erious constitutional problems’ under Northern Pipeline.”292 So, the court 
read the CEA to preclude these problems.293 Under this construction, the CFTC 
 
creates the relationship between the data submitter and the follow-on registrant, and federal law supplies the 
rule of decision.” Id. at 585 (emphasis added). Public rights “reflect simply a pragmatic understanding that 
when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters ‘that could be conclusively determined by 
the Executive and Legislative Branches,’ the danger of encroaching on the judicial powers is reduced.” Id. at 
589 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 55, 68 (1982) (plurality opinion)) 
(emphasis added). Also: “To hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation to 
furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of 
fact . . . peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to 
that task.” Id. at 590. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932)) (emphasis added). 
 283 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 284 Id. at 835. 
 285 Id. at 835–36. 
 286 Id. at 836. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Id. at 837. 
 289 Id. at 837–38. 
 290 Id. at 838. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. at 839. 
 293 Id. 
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could only hear counterclaims that alleged either a violation of the CEA or 
other CFTC regulations.294 Conti’s counterclaims alleged neither, and thus the 
“CFTC exceeded its authority” as to these claims, which the court 
dismissed.295 
The court of appeals erred when it read the CEA to preclude considering 
the constitutional issue.296 The Supreme Court found that “Congress plainly 
intended” for the CFTC to have jurisdiction over such counterclaims.297 
Subsequently, the Court had to answer, “whether the CFTC’s assumption of 
jurisdiction over common law counterclaims [violated] Article III of the 
Constitution.”298 Whether Congress may constitutionally create Article I courts 
turns on the particular adjudicative functions given to these courts.299 These 
“adjudicative functions . . . must be assessed by reference to the purposes 
underlying the requirements of Article III.”300 
 Here, the powers of the CFTC did not violate Article III because its powers 
only departed from “the traditional agency model” in one respect—jurisdiction 
over common law counterclaims.301 This deviation did not make the 
congressional scheme unconstitutional.302 Justice O’Connor wrote: 
[T]he CFTC’s assertion of counterclaim jurisdiction is limited to that 
which is necessary to make the reparations procedure 
workable . . . . The CFTC adjudication of common law counterclaims 
is incidental to, and completely dependent upon, adjudication of 
reparations claims created by federal law, and in actual fact is limited 
to claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the 
reparations claim.303 
The Court declined to “endorse an absolute prohibition” on ancillary 
jurisdiction in “the agency context.”304 In support of this, Justice O’Connor 
noted precedent wherein the Court upheld the adjudication of state law claims 
 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. at 839–40. 
 296 Id. at 841. 
 297 Id. 
 298 Id. at 847. 
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64 (1982) (plurality 
opinion)).  
 301 Id. at 852 (emphasis added). 
 302 Id. 
 303 Id. at 856 (emphasis added). 
 304 Id. at 852. 
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in federal agencies subject to judicial review “when [the] claim was ancillary 
to a federal law dispute.”305 Ancillary jurisdiction is “[a] court’s jurisdiction to 
adjudicate claims and proceedings related to a claim properly before the 
court.”306 Additionally, Justice O’Connor indicated a transaction test may be 
useful when determining proper jurisdiction of counterclaims⎯in that 
jurisdiction may be proper if the counterclaim arises from the same transaction 
as its original claim (for which jurisdiction is not questioned).307  
Important in the Court’s analysis was that the CFTC dealt only with a 
“particularized area of law,” as opposed to the broad grant of powers to 
bankruptcy courts in the Act addressed in Northern Pipeline.308 Also important 
was the fact that the orders issued by the CFTC were only enforceable by a 
district court—again, unlike the powers granted to bankruptcy courts under the 
Act.309 The review of CFTC orders was also more stringent than the review of 
bankruptcy court orders.310 The Court was “persuaded that the Congressional 
[grant] of limited CFTC jurisdiction over a narrow class of common law 
claims as incident to the CFTC’s primary and, unchallenged, adjudicative 
function” did not substantially threaten the separation of powers among the 
branches.311 The Court weighed the (1) the amount of judicial control left for 
federal courts; (2) congressional purpose for the jurisdictional grant; (3) the 
demonstrated need for the jurisdictional grant; and (4) the limited nature of the 
jurisdictional grant.312 Since Congress did not intend for the CFTC to encroach 
upon the federal courts but only “intended [the CFTC] to create an inexpensive 
and expeditious alternative forum” following “a specific and limited federal 
regulatory scheme,” the CFTC’s assertion of counterclaim jurisdiction was 
 
 305 Id. 
 306 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 928 (9th ed. 2009) (Giving the example: “if a plaintiff brings a lawsuit in 
federal court based on a federal question (such as a claim under Title VII), the defendant may assert a 
counterclaim over which the court would not otherwise have jurisdiction (such as a state-law claim of stealing 
company property)”).  
 307 Schor, 478 U.S. at 852 (discussing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966), in which the Court upheld 
the power of a bankruptcy referee to “hear and decide state law counterclaims against a creditor who filed a 
claim in bankruptcy when those counterclaims arose out of the same transaction.”).  
 308 Id. at 852–53 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85 (1982) 
(plurality opinion)) (emphasis added). 
 309 See id. at 853. 
 310 Id. Rather than the “clearly erroneous” standard, the record was reviewed with the “weight of the 
evidence” standard (essentially, de novo review). Consequently, the Schor decision was an unnecessary 
exercise because of the low deferential standard used to review orders by the commission. Id. 
 311 Id. at 854. 
 312 Id. at 855. 
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only a de minimis intrusion on the other branches and thus was not 
unconstitutional.313 
In future cases, “due regard must be given in each case to the unique 
aspects of the congressional plan at issue and its practical consequences in 
light of the larger concerns that underlie Article III.”314 Crowell and Thomas 
influenced this decision.315 These cases advised against striking down 
legislation that provides a way to “[deal] with a class of questions of fact 
which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an 
administrative agency specifically assigned to that task,” and further 
admonished that “bright-line rules cannot effectively be employed to yield 
broad principles applicable in all Article III inquiries.”316 
3. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg317 
In Granfinanciera, whether a matter was a “public right” was not the 
primary inquiry; rather, the primary inquiry was whether a party who had “not 
submitted a claim against a bankruptcy estate [had] a right to a jury trial when 
sued by the trustee . . . to recover an allegedly fraudulent [conveyance].”318 
However, if a matter was a public right Congress could assign the adjudication 
of the matter to an Article I court⎯with which juries were 
incompatible⎯without violating the Constitution.319 Therefore, whether a 
matter is a public right is key to whether the parties have the right to a jury 
trial.320 Ultimately, the Court held that even though Congress designated 
fraudulent conveyance actions as a core proceeding in the bankruptcy statute, 
the Seventh Amendment entitled “such a person to a trial by jury.”321 Justice 
Brennan set out a two-step analysis: (1) a comparison of the statutory action to 
eighteenth century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger 
of courts of law and equity; and (2) an examination of the remedy sought and a 
 
 313 Id. Also important to the Court was the expertise of the Commission in applying the CEA and other 
CFTC regulations. Id. at 856. 
 314 Id. at 857 
 315 See id. at 856–57. 
 316 See id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932)) (emphasis added); see also discussion 
supra Part II.G.1. (discussing the rejection of a bright-line rule for public versus private rights). 
 317 492 U.S. 33, 36 (1989). 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. at 53–54. 
 320 Id. at 54. 
 321 Id. 
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determination of whether it is legal or equitable in nature.322 If the result of the 
this two-step analysis “indicate[d] that a party [was] entitled to a jury trial 
under the Seventh Amendment,” then Court must decide “whether Congress 
may assign and has assigned [the] resolution of the relevant claim to a non-
Article III adjudicative body that does not use a jury.”323 
Justice Brennan, in applying the first step of the two-step analysis, stated 
that “there [was] no dispute” that actions brought alleging “preferential or 
fraudulent transfers,” were brought in the courts of law in England in the 
eighteenth century.324 Previous case law held that “[w]here an action is simply 
for the recovery . . . of a money judgment, the action is one at law.”325 Though 
prior to the Act a suit for the recovery of a preference was not a proceeding in 
bankruptcy, fraudulent conveyance actions and actions brought to recover 
preferences were brought by trustees in bankruptcy in separate plenary suits, 
“to which the Seventh Amendment applied.”326 Justice Brennan maintained 
that the issue raised in Granfinanciera had nothing to do with whether 
bankruptcy courts could conduct jury trials regarding fraudulent 
conveyances.327 Rather, the issue was whether the Seventh Amendment 
protected the right to a jury trial despite Congress’s decision to allow non-
Article III courts the power to adjudicate such claims.328 Here, Justice 
Brennan’s comparison of the statutory action to eighteenth century actions 
brought in the courts of England and his examination of the remedy sought 
indicated that the parties were entitled to a jury trial.  
Congress may deny parties their right to a jury trial when the particular 
action is a public right and assign the adjudication of the action to an Article I 
 
 322 See id. at 42. The second step of this analysis was said to be more important than the first. Id. (citing 
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987)). 
 323 Id. 
 324 Id. at 43 (quoting Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94 (1932)) (“In England, long prior to 
the enactment of our first Judiciary Act, common law actions of trover and money had and received were 
resorted to for the recovery of preferential payments of bankrupts.”). Justice Brennan also stated that 
Schoenthal actually “removed all doubt that respondent’s cause of action” was legal rather than equitable 
because in that case, a trustee brought suit in equity for the recovery of “alleged preferential payments” on the 
grounds that remedies of law were inadequate. Id. at 33. The Court held that the suit had to be brought at law 
because of “the long-settled rule that suits in equity will not be sustained where a complete remedy at 
law . . . serves to guard the right of trial by jury preserved by the Seventh Amendment.” Id. at 48 (quoting 
Schoenthal, 287 U.S. at 94). 
 325 Id. at 48 (quoting Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151 (1891)). 
 326 Id. at 50. 
 327 See id.  
 328 Id. 
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court.329 The Court adhered to the general teaching of Atlas Roofing.330 For 
Justice Brennan, this meant that “when Congress creates new statutory ‘public 
rights,’ it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which 
a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh 
Amendment[];” therefore, Congress could only deny this right in actions of 
law in which public rights are litigated.331 The public rights doctrine did not 
include “private tort, contract, [or] property cases.”332 However, Congress was 
allowed to “fashion causes of action that are closely analogous to common-law 
claims and place them beyond the ambit of the Seventh Amendment by 
assigning their resolution to a forum” without jury trials.333 For this proposition 
Justice Brennan cited cases including Atlas Roofing, Murray’s Lessee, and 
Northern Pipeline.334 Ultimately, if Congress could not allocate the 
adjudication of a fraudulent conveyance to a legislative court, then logically it 
must be adjudicated before an Article III court.335 If a matter was required to 
be adjudicated before an Article III court, then the parties may not be deprived 
of their right to a jury trial.336 
To assess what public rights meant under precedent, Justice Brennan noted 
that Northern Pipeline’s definition of public rights had been rejected and now 
a matter was a public right if Congress acted in a “valid legislative purpose 
pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I [and created] a seemingly 
‘private’ right . . . so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be 
a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the 
Article III judiciary”337 Moreover, Thomas affirmed the portion of Northern 
 
 329 Id. at 51 (citing Atlas Roofing Co., v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 
455 (1977)). 
 330 Id.  
 331 Id. (quoting Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 455) (internal citations omitted). 
 332 Id. (citing Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 458). 
 333 Id. at 52–53 (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 589, 593–94 (1985); N. 
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 73–76 (1982) (plurality opinion); Atlas 
Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450–61; Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., (18 How.) 272, 284 
(1856)).  
 334 See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 52–53. Justice Brennan also cited Atlas Roofing for the proposition 
posited in Crowell that “[o]n the common law side of the federal courts, the aid of juries is not only deemed 
appropriate but is required by the Constitution itself.” Id. at 51 (quoting Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450 
(internal citation omitted)). 
 335 See id. at 54–55. 
 336 See id. 
 337 Id. (quoting Thomas, 473 U.S. at 593–94). Justice Brennan stated: “[i]n our most recent discussion of 
the ‘public rights’ doctrine . . . [the Court] rejected the view that ‘a matter of public rights must at a minimum 
arise ‘between the government and others.’” Id. at 54 (quoting N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60 (plurality opinion)). 
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Pipeline wherein the plurality stated that “matters from their nature subject to 
‘a suit at common law or in equity or admiralty’ lie at the ‘protected core’ of 
[the] Article III judicial power.”338 This reasoning, in addition to the holding in 
Schoenthal,339 forced the conclusion that fraudulent conveyance actions were 
“quintessentially” included within the ambit of suits at common law because 
such actions resemble a state law contract claim.340 
When Congress passed the Bankruptcy Courts and the Federal Judgeship 
Act of 1984 and designated fraudulent conveyance actions as a “core” 
proceeding under § 157(b)(2)(H), Congress did not create a new cause of 
action or remedies, but rather “reclassified a pre-existing common-law cause of 
action that was not integrally related to the reformation of debtor-creditor 
relations.”341 The reclassification did not and could not destroy parties’ rights 
to a jury trial despite the deference that should be given to Congress’s decision. 
The denial of parties’ Seventh Amendment rights cannot be justified on the 
basis that permitting jury trials in fraudulent conveyance actions would 
“dismantle the statutory scheme” created by Congress for bankruptcy.342 
III.  THE STERN FACTORS & BANKRUPTCY 
Ultimately, the public rights framework of bankruptcy consists of the 
holdings of Granfinanciera, Northern Pipeline, and now, Stern.343 By not 
criticizing Granfinanciera in Stern, Chief Justice Roberts conceded that at least 
some bankruptcy court actions may involve “public rights” and so may not be 
removed from Article III.344 Chief Justice Roberts implicitly accepted the well-
established and oft-cited definition of bankruptcy as a public right—“the 
relations between an insolvent . . . and his creditors, extending to his and their 
 
 338 Id. at 55 (quoting N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71 n.25 (plurality opinion)). 
 339 See supra note 324 and accompanying text. 
 340 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 56. 
 341 Id. at 60. 
 342 Id. at 61 (quoting Atlas Roofing Co., v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 
454 (1977)). It did not matter that the enforcement of the Seventh Amendment in fraudulent conveyance 
actions would potentially decrease the efficiency of bankruptcy because “these considerations” were not 
significant. Id. at 63 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974)).  
 343 The influence of Granfinanciera was originally limited because, though relevant, the case dealt with 
whether a proceeding in bankruptcy court unconstitutionally deprived a citizen of a jury trial (and not whether 
a fraudulent conveyance was a core proceeding). Stern highlighted that Granfinanciera concluded that 
fraudulent conveyance actions were outside the public rights exception. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 
2618 (2011). Because a fraudulent conveyance action in bankruptcy is not a public right, a bankruptcy judge 
may not hear and enter final judgment in a fraudulent conveyance action. See id. 
 344 Id. at 2614 n.7. 
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relief,” or in his words, the “restructuring of debtor-creditor relationships.”345 
Consequently, courts must now work on a case-by-case basis to determine 
whether a matter is “core” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).346 Which Stern factors 
are relevant may depend on the type of case at issue; how many factors must 
be satisfied may depend on the type of case as well, although satisfaction of 
one factor may be sufficient. 
(1) Can the matter be pursued only by the grace of the other branches? 
The first factor is the most relevant to the separation of powers argument, 
i.e., the degree to which the action mirrors action entrusted to another branch, 
which is relevant to whether it may be pursued in a forum created under 
Article I. Several cases discuss this factor, including Murray’s Lessee, Thomas, 
Northern Pipeline, and Crowell. In Stern, Chief Justice Roberts briefly touches 
upon the separation of powers problem created by Article I bankruptcy courts 
based on public rights: “Is there really a threat to the separation of powers 
where Congress has conferred the judicial power outside Article III only over 
certain counterclaims in bankruptcy? The short but emphatic answer is yes.”347 
According to Chief Justice Roberts, allowing Congress to permit Article I 
courts to decide absolutely anything it deemed “necessary and proper” would 
effectively whittle the caseload for the judiciary to nearly nothing, usurping the 
functions of the third branch of government.348 The damage would ultimately 
mean that “Article III could neither serve its purpose in the system of checks 
and balances, nor preserve the integrity of judicial decision-making.”349 
(2) Was the matter historically determined exclusively by the other 
branches? 
The second Stern factor may be one of the less important factors for 
purposes of determining a public right within bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law has 
evolved considerably over the years. The framers, when they gave Congress 
the power to enact “uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies” in Article I, 
 
 345 See id. 
 346 Id. at 2598; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986). While 
Granfinanciera, Northern Pipeline, and Stern are the only bankruptcy-specific public rights cases, the other 
cases addressed in this Comment are informative and form the basis for most factors. 
 347 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620. 
 348 See id. at 2608. 
 349 Id. at 2609. The independence of the Judicial Branch should be jealously guarded, as history and 
the framers of the Constitution have indicated. See id. at 2608–09 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 
466 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961) (“There is no liberty if the power of judging be not 
separated from the legislative and executive powers.”)). 
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had the English bankruptcy system in mind, not the system as it exists today.350 
The English bankruptcy system was entirely creditor-based.351 Debtors were 
“quasi-criminals,” commonly imprisoned.352 Creditors commenced bankruptcy 
proceedings, not debtors struggling to pay their debts.353 “[A]ct[s] of 
bankruptcy” included conduct that indicated the debtor was attempting to 
prevent creditors from recovering debts owed to them.354 Furthermore, 
bankruptcy laws only applied to merchants; any non-merchants were subject to 
insolvency laws.355 
(3) Does the matter depend on the will of Congress? 
The third factor differs from the others because it stems from more recent 
public rights cases that have made congressional intent more significant in the 
public rights analysis. In Thomas, for example, the Court discussed Congress’s 
motivations for creating FIFRA.356 The Court in Schor reviewed legislative 
history to determine Congress’s purpose in delegating authority to the CFTC 
under the CEA.357 However, Congressional intent to convey certain powers to 
bankruptcy courts is not dispositive, as evidenced in Stern.358 The third factor 
will also help with the inquiries required for the fourth and fifth Stern factors. 
 
 350 Tabb, supra note 83, at 6 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). 
 351 Id.  
 352 Id. at 7. Common punishments were “forfeiture of all property, relinquishment of the 
consortium of a spouse . . . and death.” Id. 
 353 Id. at 8. Today, debtors typically file for bankruptcy; however, between the 1500s and the late 1800s 
bankruptcy was primarily an involuntary proceeding. Id. Creditors would go to the Lord Chancellor to 
commence proceedings and appoint a commissioner to oversee the proceedings. DAVID MILMAN, PERSONAL 
INSOLVENCY LAW, REGULATION AND POLICY 6–7 & n. 30 (2005). The Lord Chancellor both presided over the 
House of Lords and was the head of the judiciary and by the 1700s, ensured the separation of powers between 
the executive and judiciary. HANS DAALDER, CABINET REFORM IN BRITAIN 1914–1963 20 (1963). For these 
reasons, it may be argued that bankruptcy is both historically judicial and historically executive. 
 354 Tabb, supra note 83, at 8. By 1968, the definition of “acts of bankruptcy” included: 
[I]nsolvency or suffering or permitting a creditor to obtain a preference; appointment of a 
receiver; hindering, delaying or defrauding creditors, failure to discharge a lien. Permitting 
creditor to obtain any levy, attachment, judgment or other lien; assignment, benefit for benefit of 
creditors; or a written admission of one’s inability to pay his debts.  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 43 (4th ed. 1968). 
 355 Tabb, supra note 83, at 9. 
 356 See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 590 (1985). 
 357 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986) (“Our examination of the 
CEA and its legislative history and purpose reveals that Congress . . . plainly delegated to the CFTC the 
authority to fashion its counterclaim jurisdiction . . . to further the purposes of the reparations program.”). 
 358 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608 (2011). The legislative history for both the Act and 
Bankruptcy Court and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 clearly illustrates Congress’s motivation for creating 
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(4) Does the matter flow from a regulatory scheme? 
The fourth Stern factor is probably the most important factor when 
considering disputes arising under the Code. Stern provides an example of a 
case that can arise in a bankruptcy proceeding but does not flow from a 
regulatory scheme.359 When applying this factor, various questions should be 
addressed, including: Do courts of law supply the cause of action and an 
adequate remedy for that cause of action? Or, is it unknown to common law? Is 
the cause of action from a congressionally created right? Does the cause of 
action involve a violation of the relevant statute? The Court in Thomas 
explained that Congress could wholly replace a traditional cause of action.360 
(5) Is the matter completely dependent upon the adjudication of a claim 
created by federal law? 
The fifth Stern factor cannot, within the bankruptcy framework, be saved 
by ancillary jurisdiction.361 Unfortunately, if a cause of action is completely 
dependent upon the adjudication of a claim created by federal law, then the 
case must have a stronger tie to the particular federal law. The Court in Schor 
explained that “[t]he CFTC adjudication of common law counterclaims” fell 
within the public rights doctrine because the CFTC’s jurisdiction of such 
claims “in actual fact [was] limited to claims arising out of the same 
transaction or occurrence as the reparations claims,” indicating a possible 
transaction test.362 In this sense, the counterclaim has a stronger tie to the 
federal law because both the law and the counterclaim relate to the same 
transaction. In Stern, another consideration more relevant to bankruptcy 
emerged: whether the case is “necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the 
 
courts with broad jurisdiction: to streamline the bankruptcy process and make it workable. See supra text 
accompanying note 246. 
 359 See supra Part II.C.4. (discussing Atlas Roofing Co., v. Occupational Safety & Heath Review 
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977)). 
 360 See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 590. As a result, “Congress is not required . . . to choke the already crowded 
federal courts with new types of litigation or prevented from committing some new types of litigation to 
administrative agencies with special competence in the relevant field.” Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 455. 
 361 If ancillary jurisdiction were sufficient, the case in Stern may have been saved. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 
2611. But see discussion supra Part II.G.2. (explaining how the Court had previously upheld the adjudication 
of state law claims in federal agencies subject to judicial review when the claim was ancillary to a federal law 
dispute). 
 362 See Schor, 478 U.S. at 856 (emphasis added). Justice O’Connor also noted that the CFTC orders were 
“enforceable only by order of the district court,” and reviewed “under the same ‘weight of the evidence’ 
standard sustained in Crowell.” See id. at 852. 
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creditor’s proof of claim.”363 If an action is resolved by a ruling on a creditor’s 
proof of claim, it is plausible that the case is completely dependent upon the 
adjudication of a federal law. 
(6) Is the matter limited to a particularized area of law? 
The sixth factor emerged in Crowell, and appeared in a number of the later 
public rights cases. The factor relates more to the overall grant of power given 
by Congress in the regulatory scheme. For example, in Crowell, the agency 
could only hear and enter final judgments on cases that arose under the 
particular act.364 The appropriate inquiry is whether the cause of action at issue 
relates to the law encompassing the particular act. For purposes of bankruptcy, 
the question would be—does the case relate to bankruptcy? 
(7) Is the matter a situation in which Congress created an expert and 
inexpensive way to deal with a class of questions of fact that are peculiarly 
suited for examination and determination by an administrative agency? 
The seventh factor should not be applied to bankruptcy matters. The factor 
specifically includes the term “administrative agency,” which a bankruptcy 
court is not.365 If bankruptcy courts did qualify as administrative agencies, the 
rest of the inquiry would conclude in the affirmative⎯in that any matter could 
be a situation in which Congress created an expert and inexpensive way to deal 
with a class of questions of fact that are peculiarly suited for examination and 
determination by an administrative agency.366  
 
 363 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611 (internal citation omitted) (“Vickie’s claim is a state law action . . . not 
necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditor’s proof of claim in bankruptcy. Northern Pipeline and our 
subsequent decision in Granfinanciera, rejected the application of the ‘public rights’ exception in such 
cases.”). But, of course, this question is not necessarily dispositive. A better approach may be to consider this 
test alongside the transaction test.  
 364 Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 44 Stat. 1424 
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950); see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 63–64 (1932). 
 365 The distinction between Article I courts and executive agencies is whether Congress refers to the body 
as a “court” under Article I or an “independent agency” that is part of the executive branch. An example of this 
is the Tax Court, which was converted from an independent agency, part of the executive branch (that was, 
“for all practical purposes,” a court) to a court “established, under article I of the Constitution.” Bankruptcy 
Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2077 (1976) (testimony of William T. Plumb, Jr., Esq.); see 
also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 552 (1962); Blair v. Oesterlein Machine Co., 275 U.S. 220, 227 
(1927). 
 366 “Indeed, it is likely that Congress could always make at least a plausible showing that article I 
tribunals can provide cheaper and speedier adjudication than those created under article III, especially where 
the latter operate under resource and procedural constraints that do not affect the former.” Richard B. Saphire 
& Michael E. Solimine, Shoring Up Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 
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Overall, Stern factors one and three through six are most applicable in the 
bankruptcy context and so should be given more weight in determining 
whether matters in a bankruptcy case are public rights. 
A. Applying the Stern Factors 
Consider a hypothetical in which a creditors’ committee brings an action 
against a debtor’s board of directors for breach of fiduciary duty.367 
(1) Is it a matter that can be pursued only by the grace of other branches? 
An individual suing another for the breach of a fiduciary duty, generally, is 
not a matter that is pursued by the other branches. Arguably, it is a matter that 
is not pursued by any branch, since many fiduciary contract cases are brought 
in state courts. Case law discussed above indicates that such cases are the 
essence of the judicial power.368 
(2) Is it a matter that historically could have been determined exclusively 
by the other branches?  
It is unlikely that any argument can be made that an action against an 
individual, individuals, or an entity, for the breach of a fiduciary duty, is an 
action that was historically determined by any branch other than the judiciary. 
(3) Does it depend on the will of Congress? 
No, this type of action does not depend on the will of Congress. No aspect, 
other than the existence of the creditor’s committee, results from an act of 
Congress. More recent case law⎯such as Thomas and Schor⎯has shown that 
who the parties are in a case does not help determine if the case falls within the 
public rights doctrine.369 In bankruptcy, any case brought by a trustee in 
 
B.U. L. REV. 85, 122 (1988). Additionally, the same issue develops for the seventh factor that persists in the 
sixth—that the factor relates more to grants of power by Congress, rather than a particular case within the 
framework of a Congressional grant. 
 367 For this situation, as for all other situations, do not consider the parties involved, but only the action 
and its relationship to the federal scheme at issue (in this case, the Code). Keep in mind that a “yes” answer to 
any of the factors helps indicate that the action falls within the public rights exception. 
 368 See discussion supra Part II.E. “Private–rights disputes, on the other hand, lie at the core of the 
historically recognized judicial power.” N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 55, 70 
(1982) (plurality opinion). 
 369 See discussion supra Part II.G.1.  
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bankruptcy would receive a “yes” answer under this factor. Again, case law 
has shown that such a grant would be too broad.370 
(4) Does it flow from a regulatory scheme? 
No. A suit for breach of a fiduciary duty does not flow from a regulatory 
scheme (beyond the Act providing for the creation of a creditor’s 
committee).371 
(5) Is it completely dependent upon adjudication of a claim created by 
federal law? 
A breach of fiduciary duty does not involve a transaction with which to 
apply the transaction test,372 nor is there a proof of claim with which to apply 
the proof of claim test. There is no claim created by federal law at all, and 
therefore, the cause of action cannot be completely dependent upon the 
adjudication of a claim created by federal law. 
(6) Is it limited to a particularized area of law? 
No. The violation of a fiduciary does not relate to bankruptcy, which would 
be the only particularized area of law here. 
Because the seventh factor should not be applied to bankruptcy cases, the 
analysis is done. None of the Stern factors (the answers to which are all “no”) 
indicate that an action for a breach of fiduciary duty is a public right, and 
 
 370 A modified version of this factor would be—as stated in Murray’s Lessee—does the case depend on 
the will of Congress as to whether a remedy in the court would even be allowed? See Murray’s Lessee v. 
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856). There is an inherent problem with 
applying this version of the question to bankruptcy law (the restructuring of the relationship between a debtor 
and his creditors), because there was no national bankruptcy law for a period of time after 1788. Tabb, supra 
note 83, at 14 (explaining that the first federal bankruptcy law was enacted eleven years after the ratification of 
the Constitution—the Bankruptcy Act of 1800— and lasted only three years). After 1803 states were left to 
“pick up the slack” until the Bankruptcy Act of 1841. Id. Individuals could bring bankruptcy cases to state 
courts without the will of Congress. Today, individuals may still choose state law remedies for bankruptcy 
over federal bankruptcy law. Thus, the restructuring of the relationship between a debtor and his creditors does 
not depend on the will of Congress. Allowing this one factor control over the analysis would mean that 
bankruptcy, at its most basic level, is not a “public right.” This conclusion would run contrary to the most 
recent Supreme Court decisions regarding public rights. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 
(2011); Granfinanciera, S.A., v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 61 (1989). 
 371 An action for breach of fiduciary duty exemplifies how, as in many cases, the third, fourth, and fifth 
factors may all have the same answer. 
 372 See supra note 362 and accompanying text. 
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therefore, a bankruptcy court may not hear and enter a final judgment in the 
action for breach of a fiduciary duty.373 
CONCLUSION 
The Stern decision confirmed that a bankruptcy court may not hear a matter 
if it does not fall within the public rights exception. Regrettably, the Court 
declined to give much guidance on “the public rights framework for 
bankruptcy.”374 The proposed seven-factor analysis for identifying public 
rights includes key aspects from the convoluted case law history—a case law 
history that at times does not comport with precedent on Congress’s power 
under the Bankruptcy Clause or Congress’s power to establish Article I 
courts.375 Moreover, the use of the seven-factor analysis takes into account 
how these key aspects of public rights case law have been interpreted by later 
justices, and how they ultimately shaped the Stern decision.376 This Comment 
also provided an example of how these factors should be applied to 
bankruptcy, generally.377 While each factor should be considered, factors one, 
and three through six are the most pertinent within the bankruptcy context: the 
other factors either apply only to executive agencies or (like the second Stern 
factor) would effectively tag all of bankruptcy (i.e., the “restructuring of 
debtor-creditor relationships”) as a private, rather than a public, right—a 
conclusion that clearly runs afoul of Stern.378 Ultimately, bankruptcy judges 
are in a position to follow Stern; instead they must do their own spadework to 




 373 Some other hypotheticals to consider: (1) A bank files a claim based on a credit card debt. The trustee 
counterclaims seeking a money judgment for violations of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 599 (West 2012) (and the Federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. § 227 
(2010))). (Yes.); (2) A chapter 7 trustee sues a debtor’s mother for a fraudulent transfer. (No.); (3) A landlord 
files a claim for breach of lease after the lease has been rejected and the debtor files a counterclaim that the 
lease is unconscionable under state law and seeks to recover all rents paid over the years. (Yes.); (4) A lender 
files a secured claim in the bankruptcy court and the debtor files an action against the lender for usury under 
applicable state law. (Yes.) These hypotheticals were thoughtfully provided by Roberta A. Colton, Esq., and 
Judge Michael G. Williamson, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida. 
 374 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614 n.7. 
 375 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 376 See discussion supra Part II.E.  
 377 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 378 See supra notes 344–45. 
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described by Chief Justice Roberts. Following this seven-factor analysis is a 
primitive, but comprehensive, tool for considering the limits of the public 
rights doctrine.  
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